pencil-dev-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer v1cferr 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an Electron application) directly from pencil.dev — the official vendor domain for this product. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering, but the tarball is a prebuilt executable bundle (Electron/Chromium-based) installed to /opt and run directly. The supply-chain risk is real but typical for -bin AUR packages: if the vendor's download URL were compromised or the domain hijacked, users would execute arbitrary code. The URL is the official vendor site (not a personal/random host), the checksum is present, and the pattern is standard for proprietary Electron app packaging in the AUR. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a third-party host with no reproducibility), but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://www.pencil.dev/download/Pencil-linux-x64.tar.gz"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (an Electron application) directly from pencil.dev — the official vendor domain for this product. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering, but the tarball is a prebuilt executable bundle (Electron/Chromium-based) installed to /opt and run directly. The supply-chain risk is real but typical for -bin AUR packages: if the vendor's download URL were compromised or the domain hijacked, users would execute arbitrary code. The URL is the official vendor site (not a personal/random host), the checksum is present, and the pattern is standard for proprietary Electron app packaging in the AUR. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a third-party host with no reproducibility), but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Victor Ferreira
2
3pkgname=pencil-dev-bin
4pkgver=1.1.56
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Design on canvas. Land in code. Increases engineering speed by bringing designing directly into your IDE."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://pencil.dev"
9license=('custom')
10provides=('pencil-dev')
11conflicts=('pencil-dev')
12options=('!strip' '!debug')
13depends=('alsa-lib' 'at-spi2-core' 'cairo' 'dbus' 'expat' 'glib2' 'libcups' 'libdrm' 'libxcomposite' 'libxdamage' 'libxext' 'libxfixes' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxrandr' 'mesa' 'nspr' 'nss' 'pango')
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://www.pencil.dev/download/Pencil-linux-x64.tar.gz"
15 "pencil-dev.desktop"
16 "pencil.png")
17sha256sums=('219933964e4e0d0487f43acef90b5e897cdc3dcbf97b75e4b8258ea7c2f49afc'
18 '73fda772f0429d82e5168ff8de68bfb9ed72ace660758354697f816ba0666a5f'
19 '131ee5d9793ddaca67577727532493fb451a02e0903fc804b93d2142de16b331')
20
21package() {
22 cd "${srcdir}/Pencil-${pkgver}-linux-x64"
23
24 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
25 cp -r * "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
26
27 # Set permissions for chrome-sandbox
28 chmod 4755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/chrome-sandbox"
29
30 # Create binary symlink
31 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
32 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/pencil" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/pencil-dev"
33
34 # Install desktop entry
35 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/pencil-dev.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/pencil-dev.desktop"
36
37 # Install application icon
38 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/pencil.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/pencil.png"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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