pfring-dkms
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from packages.ntop.org, which is ntop's official Debian/Ubuntu package repository (ntop is the legitimate vendor of PF_RING). This is not a random personal host — ntop.org is the upstream vendor and packages.ntop.org is their official distribution channel, analogous to how other vendors host their own apt/yum repos. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification against the specific binary. However, the concern is real in the sense that: (1) a prebuilt binary kernel module source package is being extracted and installed via DKMS, meaning compiled kernel code will be executed in ring 0; (2) the source is a binary .deb rather than source code from the canonical GitHub repo (https://github.com/ntop/PF_RING); (3) packages.ntop.org is an external binary host not under AUR/Arch infrastructure control. The sha256 pinning mitigates substitution attacks but not a compromised upstream release. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from vendor's own repo rather than building from source) but not clearly malicious — it is a common pattern for DKMS packages where the vendor distributes source via their package repo. Rating remains MEDIUM: real concern, not an attack.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://packages.ntop.org/apt-stable/bookworm/all/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_all.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from packages.ntop.org, which is ntop's official Debian/Ubuntu package repository (ntop is the legitimate vendor of PF_RING). This is not a random personal host — ntop.org is the upstream vendor and packages.ntop.org is their official distribution channel, analogous to how other vendors host their own apt/yum repos. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification against the specific binary. However, the concern is real in the sense that: (1) a prebuilt binary kernel module source package is being extracted and installed via DKMS, meaning compiled kernel code will be executed in ring 0; (2) the source is a binary .deb rather than source code from the canonical GitHub repo (https://github.com/ntop/PF_RING); (3) packages.ntop.org is an external binary host not under AUR/Arch infrastructure control. The sha256 pinning mitigates substitution attacks but not a compromised upstream release. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from vendor's own repo rather than building from source) but not clearly malicious — it is a common pattern for DKMS packages where the vendor distributes source via their package repo. Rating remains MEDIUM: real concern, not an attack.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Reese Wang <thuwrx10 at gmail dot com>
pkgname=pfring-dkms
_pkgname=${pkgname%-dkms}
pkgver=8.6.1.8976
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="High-speed packet processing framework"
url="https://github.com/ntop/PF_RING"
arch=('any')
depends=('numactl' 'dkms')
provides=("PFRING-MODULE=${pkgver}")
source=("https://packages.ntop.org/apt-stable/bookworm/all/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_all.deb"
"0001-subdirs-to-m.patch")
sha256sums=('5d805777cca322fe2749568483a8541d4c311dbacfeb34caec6b2ff22d502848'
'cfa0074ea07bf19b7476714092ed1031ded4c4089919628e3caf3308608d20d6')
prepare() {
cd "${srcdir}"
tar xvf data.tar.xz
chmod 755 "usr/src/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}"
chmod 755 "usr/src/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}/linux"
chmod 755 "usr/src/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}/pfring-dkms-mkdeb"
chmod 755 "usr/src/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}/pfring-dkms-mkdeb/debian"
patch --forward --strip=1 --input=0001-subdirs-to-m.patch
rm -rf usr/share \
usr/src/pfring-8.6.1.8976/pfring-dkms-mkdeb/
}
package() {
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr" "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |