phizclip-studio

MEDIUM
maintainer zaeyee 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage (an executable binary) from a personal/unofficial cloud storage host (pan-dev.xyue.zip on a non-standard HTTPS port 8443). This is a direct-download link to a file-sharing service, not an official vendor release host or a well-known mirror. While a sha256sum is provided, the trust anchor is only as strong as the host: if the file at that URL is silently replaced (the host is under the maintainer's or a third party's control), users would receive a different binary that passes no integrity check beyond the stored hash. AppImages are self-contained executables that run with user privileges and can contain arbitrary code. The combination of an executed binary + unofficial personal host constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage"::"https://pan-dev.xyue.zip:8443/s/TtN7ozqAmAk2smA/download/PhizClip%20Studio-1.2.0.AppImage"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage (an executable binary) from a personal/unofficial cloud storage host (pan-dev.xyue.zip on a non-standard HTTPS port 8443). This is a direct-download link to a file-sharing service, not an official vendor release host or a well-known mirror. While a sha256sum is provided, the trust anchor is only as strong as the host: if the file at that URL is silently replaced (the host is under the maintainer's or a third party's control), users would receive a different binary that passes no integrity check beyond the stored hash. AppImages are self-contained executables that run with user privileges and can contain arbitrary code. The combination of an executed binary + unofficial personal host constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: zaeyee <zaeyee@163.com>
2pkgname="phizclip-studio"
3pkgver="1.2.0"
4pkgrel=3
5pkgdesc="Developer tools for PhizClip"
6arch=("x86_64")
7url="https://open.phiz.chat/"
8license=('custom')
9depends=()
10source=(
11 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage"::"https://pan-dev.xyue.zip:8443/s/TtN7ozqAmAk2smA/download/PhizClip%20Studio-1.2.0.AppImage"
12 "${pkgname}.desktop"
13 "${pkgname}.png")
14sha256sums=('01f7b7e312abe19d763315f79c46e91346e54f77e062a0a3efe0eecfa6991eea'
15 'bfcc785d47ed5e0a08be334dfe535f6ee4f7ce4acdc2bdf2adceadfafca13be7'
16 '53239505b912d9cb80a1f3e22ead56edb56a4a0d8b6b99536a6ab46a1ae8e9a1')
17options=(!strip)
18
19package() {
20 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/PhizClip-Studio/PhizClip-Studio.AppImage"
21 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
22 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/PhizClip-Studio.png"
23}
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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