phratch

maintainer erickpires · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary archive (Phratch4.1-linux.zip) from phratch.com, which is the official project website for Phratch. The archive is unpacked and a binary ('phratch') is symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning the downloaded content is directly executed. There is a fixed md5sum checksum, which provides some integrity guarantee but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The host (phratch.com) is the upstream vendor's own domain, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. There are also minor issues: a duplicate 'source=' line (the first one referencing a local file that doesn't exist), and use of MD5 rather than SHA256. Overall this is a real medium-severity concern: a prebuilt executable from a small, unofficial project host with only MD5 verification, but not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=('Phratch.zip::http://phratch.com/download/Phratch4.1-linux.zip' 'phratch.desktop')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary archive (Phratch4.1-linux.zip) from phratch.com, which is the official project website for Phratch. The archive is unpacked and a binary ('phratch') is symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning the downloaded content is directly executed. There is a fixed md5sum checksum, which provides some integrity guarantee but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The host (phratch.com) is the upstream vendor's own domain, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. There are also minor issues: a duplicate 'source=' line (the first one referencing a local file that doesn't exist), and use of MD5 rather than SHA256. Overall this is a real medium-severity concern: a prebuilt executable from a small, unofficial project host with only MD5 verification, but not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Erick Pires <rckkas@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Laurent Laffont <laurent.laffont@gmail.com>
3
4pkgname=phratch
5pkgver=4.1
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Phratch is a programming language that makes it easy to create your own interactive stories, animations, games, music, and art — and share your creations on the web. Port of Scratch on Pharo."
8arch=(i686 x86_64)
9source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz)
10url="http://www.phratch.com"
11license=('MIT')
12makedepends=('gendesk')
13depends=('pharo-vm')
14
15source=('Phratch.zip::http://phratch.com/download/Phratch4.1-linux.zip' 'phratch.desktop')
16
17md5sums=('aec0d828e291ebbe0a225d5b12576c80' '97c22472ed23597881c547a67c8eee95')
18
19prepare() {
20 gendesk -f --pkgname "$pkgname" --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc"
21}
22
23
24package() {
25 cd $srcdir/
26 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/share/phratch/
27 unzip Phratch.zip -d $pkgdir/usr/share/phratch/
28
29 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/bin/
30 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/
31
32 chgrp users $pkgdir/usr/share/phratch/Phratch/shared/Pharo4.0.changes
33 chmod 775 $pkgdir/usr/share/phratch/Phratch/shared/Pharo4.0.changes
34
35 ln -s /usr/share/phratch/Phratch/phratch $pkgdir/usr/bin/phratch
36
37 cp $pkgdir/usr/share/phratch/Phratch/icons/Pharo.png $pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/$pkgname.png
38 install -Dm644 "$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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