pixel-fx-companion-app
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
"https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: ABOhiccups <info@abohiccups.com>
pkgname=pixel-fx-companion-app
pkgver=1.9.24
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Receives Game ID from Pixel FX devices and publishes Discord activity status with artwork"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/"
license=('custom')
depends=(
'gtk3'
'nss'
'alsa-lib'
'libxss'
'libxtst'
'libnotify'
'xdg-utils'
)
source=(
"https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
)
sha256sums=('aca986e3170abcf27a29059f02623dc0810d161fdbcc231963f684e6d27f3daa')
prepare() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz"
}
package() {
# Application files
cp -r "${srcdir}/opt" "${pkgdir}/"
# Desktop entry
install -Dm644 \
"${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/"*.desktop \
"${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/pixel-fx-companion-app.desktop"
# Icons
if [ -d "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" ]; then
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
fi
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |