pixel-fx-companion-app

MEDIUM
maintainer ABOhiccups 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:19 "https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: ABOhiccups <info@abohiccups.com>
2pkgname=pixel-fx-companion-app
3pkgver=1.9.24
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Receives Game ID from Pixel FX devices and publishes Discord activity status with artwork"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/"
8license=('custom')
9depends=(
10 'gtk3'
11 'nss'
12 'alsa-lib'
13 'libxss'
14 'libxtst'
15 'libnotify'
16 'xdg-utils'
17)
18source=(
19 "https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
20)
21sha256sums=('aca986e3170abcf27a29059f02623dc0810d161fdbcc231963f684e6d27f3daa')
22
23prepare() {
24 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
25 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz"
26}
27
28package() {
29 # Application files
30 cp -r "${srcdir}/opt" "${pkgdir}/"
31
32 # Desktop entry
33 install -Dm644 \
34 "${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/"*.desktop \
35 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/pixel-fx-companion-app.desktop"
36
37 # Icons
38 if [ -d "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" ]; then
39 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
40 fi
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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