pixel-fx-companion-app
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
"https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from firmware.pixelfx.co, which is the official Pixel FX vendor host for their companion app. The binary is an Electron app (gtk3/nss/alsa-lib deps confirm this) extracted and installed directly under /opt. While the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's own distribution server (not a personal/unofficial mirror), the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary blob with no source build option. The sha256sum provides integrity against tampering in transit but not against the vendor serving a malicious binary. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled but externally-hosted source, with no way to verify the binary's contents. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern since any compromise of firmware.pixelfx.co would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: ABOhiccups <info@abohiccups.com>
pkgname=pixel-fx-companion-app
pkgver=1.9.24
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Receives Game ID from Pixel FX devices and publishes Discord activity status with artwork"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/"
license=('custom')
depends=(
'gtk3'
'nss'
'alsa-lib'
'libxss'
'libxtst'
'libnotify'
'xdg-utils'
)
source=(
"https://firmware.pixelfx.co/companion-app/linux/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
)
sha256sums=('aca986e3170abcf27a29059f02623dc0810d161fdbcc231963f684e6d27f3daa')
prepare() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/Pixel%20FX%20Companion%20App-${pkgver}-amd64.deb"
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz"
}
package() {
# Application files
cp -r "${srcdir}/opt" "${pkgdir}/"
# Desktop entry
install -Dm644 \
"${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/"*.desktop \
"${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/pixel-fx-companion-app.desktop"
# Icons
if [ -d "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" ]; then
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
fi
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |