pngthermal
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (either pngthermal32 or pngthermal64) from an attachment on encode.su, a data compression forum. This is not the project's official release infrastructure — there is no GitHub, official website, or canonical release host. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any build step. While encode.su is a legitimate compression/encoding community forum and the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the supply-chain concern is real: the binary originates from a forum attachment rather than a verifiable upstream source, and there is no way to audit what the binary actually does. A compromised forum attachment or a swapped file (if the sha256 were ever updated) would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source code available for review.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:17
source=("http://encode.su/attachment.php?attachmentid=3260&d=1416178646")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (either pngthermal32 or pngthermal64) from an attachment on encode.su, a data compression forum. This is not the project's official release infrastructure — there is no GitHub, official website, or canonical release host. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any build step. While encode.su is a legitimate compression/encoding community forum and the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the supply-chain concern is real: the binary originates from a forum attachment rather than a verifiable upstream source, and there is no way to audit what the binary actually does. A compromised forum attachment or a swapped file (if the sha256 were ever updated) would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source code available for review.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: bitwave
pkgname=pngthermal
pkgver=0.2a
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="pseudo thermal view of PNG compression efficiency"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://encode.su/threads/1725-pngthermal-pseudo-thermal-view-of-PNG-compression-efficiency"
license=('custom')
groups=()
depends=()
makedepends=()
checkdepends=()
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
source=("http://encode.su/attachment.php?attachmentid=3260&d=1416178646")
sha256sums=('7479edcf7148bb6a571daca50dde6a69df752407eede1e2ecd01d64c9d42a142')
package() {
cd "pngthermal_gnu-linux/"
install -d $pkgdir/usr/bin
[ "$CARCH" = "i686" ] && install -m755 pngthermal32 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
[ "$CARCH" = "x86_64" ] && install -m755 pngthermal64 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |