pngthermal

MEDIUM
maintainer bitwave 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (either pngthermal32 or pngthermal64) from an attachment on encode.su, a data compression forum. This is not the project's official release infrastructure — there is no GitHub, official website, or canonical release host. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any build step. While encode.su is a legitimate compression/encoding community forum and the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the supply-chain concern is real: the binary originates from a forum attachment rather than a verifiable upstream source, and there is no way to audit what the binary actually does. A compromised forum attachment or a swapped file (if the sha256 were ever updated) would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source code available for review.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source=("http://encode.su/attachment.php?attachmentid=3260&d=1416178646")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (either pngthermal32 or pngthermal64) from an attachment on encode.su, a data compression forum. This is not the project's official release infrastructure — there is no GitHub, official website, or canonical release host. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any build step. While encode.su is a legitimate compression/encoding community forum and the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the supply-chain concern is real: the binary originates from a forum attachment rather than a verifiable upstream source, and there is no way to audit what the binary actually does. A compromised forum attachment or a swapped file (if the sha256 were ever updated) would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source code available for review.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: bitwave
2pkgname=pngthermal
3pkgver=0.2a
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="pseudo thermal view of PNG compression efficiency"
6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
7url="http://encode.su/threads/1725-pngthermal-pseudo-thermal-view-of-PNG-compression-efficiency"
8license=('custom')
9groups=()
10depends=()
11makedepends=()
12checkdepends=()
13optdepends=()
14provides=()
15conflicts=()
16
17source=("http://encode.su/attachment.php?attachmentid=3260&d=1416178646")
18sha256sums=('7479edcf7148bb6a571daca50dde6a69df752407eede1e2ecd01d64c9d42a142')
19
20package() {
21 cd "pngthermal_gnu-linux/"
22 install -d $pkgdir/usr/bin
23 [ "$CARCH" = "i686" ] && install -m755 pngthermal32 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
24 [ "$CARCH" = "x86_64" ] && install -m755 pngthermal64 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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