podpisuj
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://www.podpisuj.sk/staticweb/install/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the official project domain (podpisuj.sk), extracts it, and installs the contents directly. This is a legitimate pattern for proprietary software that does not distribute source code, and the sha256sum is pinned. The risk is real but typical for binary repacks: if the upstream host is compromised or the maintainer updates the checksum to a malicious build, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. The host is the vendor's own domain (not a personal/random host), which slightly reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain concern. This is a standard medium-severity binary repack — not a false positive, but not an active attack either.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlightedpkgname=podpisuj
pkgver=5.7.120
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Podpisuj - signature software from Slovakia"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.podpisuj.sk/"
license=('custom')
depends=('glibc' 'xdg-utils')
makedepends=('binutils' 'libarchive')
options=('!emptydirs')
install="${pkgname}.install"
source=("https://www.podpisuj.sk/staticweb/install/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb")
sha256sums=('c8861affd1d259efe5bd580f76f3eab59c5d4326ba489f8ed40b0a4b76c9bc6d')
prepare() {
ar x "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
bsdtar -xf data.tar.zst -C "$srcdir"
}
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
install -d "$pkgdir"
[ -d opt ] && cp -a opt "$pkgdir/"
[ -d usr ] && cp -a usr "$pkgdir/"
[ -d etc ] && cp -a etc "$pkgdir/"
[ -d lib ] && cp -a lib "$pkgdir/"
install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -s /opt/podpisuj/bin/Podpisuj "$pkgdir/usr/bin/podpisuj"
install -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname"
install -Dm0644 "$srcdir/opt/podpisuj/share/doc/copyright" \
"$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/license"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |