pomello

MEDIUM
maintainer romelpinilla 6 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/Chromium binary .deb from pomelloapp.com (the official vendor site for this app) and installs it directly into /opt/Pomello. The URL uses a 'latest' redirect rather than a versioned/immutable URL, meaning the downloaded file could change without the md5sums catching it if the server swaps the binary — though the md5sums do provide some protection against silent substitution at review time. The host is the official vendor domain, not a personal/random host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. The core concern is a prebuilt closed-source Electron binary being executed directly from a vendor host with only MD5 (weak, collision-prone) checksums and no reproducibility. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-Arch-official source with weak integrity guarantees and a mutable 'latest' URL, even though the vendor domain appears legitimate.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source_i686=("Pomello-${pkgver}.deb::https://pomelloapp.com/download/linux/latest?dist=ubuntu&arch=32")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/Chromium binary .deb from pomelloapp.com (the official vendor site for this app) and installs it directly into /opt/Pomello. The URL uses a 'latest' redirect rather than a versioned/immutable URL, meaning the downloaded file could change without the md5sums catching it if the server swaps the binary — though the md5sums do provide some protection against silent substitution at review time. The host is the official vendor domain, not a personal/random host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. The core concern is a prebuilt closed-source Electron binary being executed directly from a vendor host with only MD5 (weak, collision-prone) checksums and no reproducibility. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-Arch-official source with weak integrity guarantees and a mutable 'latest' URL, even though the vendor domain appears legitimate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Luigi Guevara <luigi.t.guevara@killua.me>
2pkgname=pomello
3pkgver=0.10.17
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Stay Focused. Accomplish more."
6arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
7url="https://pomelloapp.com/"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('libsystemd')
10makedepends=('tar' 'binutils')
11install='pomello.install'
12source_i686=("Pomello-${pkgver}.deb::https://pomelloapp.com/download/linux/latest?dist=ubuntu&arch=32")
13source_x86_64=("Pomello-${pkgver}.deb::https://pomelloapp.com/download/linux/latest?dist=ubuntu")
14options=(!strip)
15md5sums_i686=('46f65da60c68c02c5dff9ffc4013b89b')
16md5sums_x86_64=('3fef96f489aa9ca66cb06c1cc20440f8')
17
18prepare() {
19 cd "$srcdir"
20
21 ar x "Pomello-${pkgver}.deb"
22}
23
24package() {
25 cd "$srcdir"
26
27 tar -C "$pkgdir" -xf data.tar.xz
28
29 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
30
31 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/opt/Pomello/lib"
32 ln -nsf /usr/lib/libudev.so.1 "$pkgdir/opt/Pomello/lib/libudev.so.0"
33
34 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/Pomello/LICENSES.chromium.html" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSES.chromium.html"
35 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/Pomello/LICENSE.electron.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE.electron.txt"
36
37 ln -nsf "/opt/Pomello/pomello" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/pomello"
38 RPM_BUILD_ROOT="$pkgdir" desktop-file-install "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/pomello.desktop"
39 sed -e 's#/opt/Pomello/pomello#/usr/bin/pomello#' -i "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/pomello.desktop"
40}
41
42# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion