poplog-git

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD pulls a prebuilt binary archive 'packages-V16.tar.bz2' from cs.bham.ac.uk over plain HTTP (not HTTPS) with no checksum verification (SKIP). This archive is then copied into the build tree and used during compilation/installation. While cs.bham.ac.uk is a legitimate UK university host associated with the Poplog project (Aaron Sloman at Birmingham is a well-known Poplog contributor), the combination of: (1) plain HTTP download susceptible to MITM, (2) no integrity check (SKIP sha256sum), and (3) the archive containing executed/compiled code that gets installed, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The git source also uses SKIP, though git+https is somewhat self-authenticating via the remote. The HTTP+SKIP combination for a binary archive is a real medium-severity concern regardless of the host's legitimacy.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 "http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/poplog/V16/DL/packages-V16.tar.bz2"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD pulls a prebuilt binary archive 'packages-V16.tar.bz2' from cs.bham.ac.uk over plain HTTP (not HTTPS) with no checksum verification (SKIP). This archive is then copied into the build tree and used during compilation/installation. While cs.bham.ac.uk is a legitimate UK university host associated with the Poplog project (Aaron Sloman at Birmingham is a well-known Poplog contributor), the combination of: (1) plain HTTP download susceptible to MITM, (2) no integrity check (SKIP sha256sum), and (3) the archive containing executed/compiled code that gets installed, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. The git source also uses SKIP, though git+https is somewhat self-authenticating via the remote. The HTTP+SKIP combination for a binary archive is a real medium-severity concern regardless of the host's legitimacy.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Will Price <willprice94@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Aaron Sloman <a.sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk>
3# Contributor: Steve Leach <sfkleach@gmail.com>
4
5pkgname=poplog-git
6pkgver=v0.3.0.r136.gb4d3163
7pkgrel=2
8pkgdesc="poplog development system"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="https://getpoplog.github.io/"
11license=('custom:poplog')
12depends=('tcsh' 'libxext' 'libxt' 'openmotif' 'libxp' 'ncurses5-compat-libs')
13optdepends=('espeak: for run-speaking-eliza demo')
14conflicts=(poplog)
15source=(
16 "git+https://github.com/GetPoplog/Seed"
17 "http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/poplog/V16/DL/packages-V16.tar.bz2"
18)
19sha256sums=(
20 'SKIP'
21 'SKIP'
22)
23
24_prefix=/opt
25_bindir=/usr/bin
26prepare() {
27 cd "$srcdir/Seed"
28
29 mkdir -p "$srcdir/Seed/_download"
30 cp "$srcdir/packages-V16.tar.bz2" "$srcdir/Seed/_download"
31 touch "$srcdir/Seed/_download/Packages.Downloaded.proxy"
32}
33
34build() {
35 cd "$srcdir/Seed"
36 make bindir="$_bindir" prefix="$_prefix"
37}
38
39package() {
40 echo "$pkgdir"
41 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man1"
42
43 cd "$srcdir/Seed"
44 make install DESTDIR="$pkgdir" prefix="$_prefix" bindir="$_bindir"
45
46 for f in "$pkgdir/$_prefix/share/poplog/current_usepop/pop/doc/man/"*; do
47 ln -s -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man1" "${f##$pkgdir}"
48 done
49}
50
51pkgver() {
52 cd "$srcdir/Seed"
53 git describe --long | sed 's/\([^-]*-g\)/r\1/;s/-/./g'
54}
55
56# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
57

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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