popular-packages

maintainer Xavion · 19 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a file named 'popular-packages' (no extension) from a personal/commercial S3-compatible object store (DreamObjects) and installs it directly as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no upstream source repository, no version tag, no tarball — just a bare binary/script blob hosted on an unofficial third-party storage host. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution by whoever controls that S3 bucket. Since the installed artifact is executed code (a shell script or binary placed in /usr/bin with mode 755), this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket is compromised or the maintainer replaces the file, users get arbitrary code execution with no way to audit the change. This matches the medium severity definition exactly: executed code from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:7 url="https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jpg"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a file named 'popular-packages' (no extension) from a personal/commercial S3-compatible object store (DreamObjects) and installs it directly as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no upstream source repository, no version tag, no tarball — just a bare binary/script blob hosted on an unofficial third-party storage host. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution by whoever controls that S3 bucket. Since the installed artifact is executed code (a shell script or binary placed in /usr/bin with mode 755), this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket is compromised or the maintainer replaces the file, users get arbitrary code execution with no way to audit the change. This matches the medium severity definition exactly: executed code from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Xavion <Xavion (dot) 0 (at) Gmail (dot) com>
2
3pkgname=popular-packages
4pkgver=0.6.3
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Lists popular packages not (yet) installed"
7url="https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jpg"
8arch=("any")
9license=("GPL3")
10depends=("wget" "jq" "package-query")
11#optdepends=("pacman-cage: Better performance")
12options=(!emptydirs)
13source=(https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname})
14
15package() {
16 cd "${srcdir}"
17
18 install -D -m755 ${pkgname} "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/${pkgname}
19}
20
21sha256sums=('4df195ee81471bbe2459b42c12e3a7428772cac71080995b4e4da0817a3c8c94')
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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