popular-packages

MEDIUM

maintainer Xavion 19 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a file named 'popular-packages' (no extension) from a personal/commercial S3-compatible object store (DreamObjects) and installs it directly as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no upstream source repository, no version tag, no tarball — just a bare binary/script blob hosted on an unofficial third-party storage host. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution by whoever controls that S3 bucket. Since the installed artifact is executed code (a shell script or binary placed in /usr/bin with mode 755), this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket is compromised or the maintainer replaces the file, users get arbitrary code execution with no way to audit the change. This matches the medium severity definition exactly: executed code from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:7 url="https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jpg"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a file named 'popular-packages' (no extension) from a personal/commercial S3-compatible object store (DreamObjects) and installs it directly as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no upstream source repository, no version tag, no tarball — just a bare binary/script blob hosted on an unofficial third-party storage host. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a deliberate substitution by whoever controls that S3 bucket. Since the installed artifact is executed code (a shell script or binary placed in /usr/bin with mode 755), this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket is compromised or the maintainer replaces the file, users get arbitrary code execution with no way to audit the change. This matches the medium severity definition exactly: executed code from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Xavion <Xavion (dot) 0 (at) Gmail (dot) com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=popular-packages
    
      4pkgver=0.6.3
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Lists popular packages not (yet) installed"
    
      7url="https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jpg"
    
      8arch=("any")
    
      9license=("GPL3")
    
      10depends=("wget" "jq" "package-query")
    
      11#optdepends=("pacman-cage: Better performance")
    
      12options=(!emptydirs)
    
      13source=(https://pub-dist.s3.us-east-005.dream.io/Software/${pkgname}/${pkgname})
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16	cd "${srcdir}"
    
      17
    
      18	install -D -m755 ${pkgname} "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      19}
    
      20
    
      21sha256sums=('4df195ee81471bbe2459b42c12e3a7428772cac71080995b4e4da0817a3c8c94')
    
      22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2