promptr-bin

maintainer toxdes · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries from packages.toxdes.com, a personal/maintainer-controlled host rather than GitHub releases or another well-known distribution channel. The package is a GTK4 overlay application (executed code), not mere data. While the checksums are present and pinned, they only protect against accidental corruption or a specific tampering event — they do not establish trust in the origin host itself. If the maintainer's personal server is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, users would receive and execute arbitrary binaries. The upstream GitHub repo exists (github.com/toxdes/promptr) but the binaries are not served from GitHub Releases, which is the standard and more auditable approach. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from an unofficial personal host with no reproducibility guarantee beyond a static checksum.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=("promptr-${pkgver}-x86_64.tar.gz::https://packages.toxdes.com/releases/promptr_${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries from packages.toxdes.com, a personal/maintainer-controlled host rather than GitHub releases or another well-known distribution channel. The package is a GTK4 overlay application (executed code), not mere data. While the checksums are present and pinned, they only protect against accidental corruption or a specific tampering event — they do not establish trust in the origin host itself. If the maintainer's personal server is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, users would receive and execute arbitrary binaries. The upstream GitHub repo exists (github.com/toxdes/promptr) but the binaries are not served from GitHub Releases, which is the standard and more auditable approach. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from an unofficial personal host with no reproducibility guarantee beyond a static checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: toxdes <hi@toxdes.com>
2pkgname=promptr-bin
3pkgver=0.2.3
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="GTK4 overlay prompt for opencode"
6arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
7url="https://github.com/toxdes/promptr"
8license=('MIT')
9depends=('gtk4' 'gtksourceview5' 'gtk4-layer-shell')
10
11source_x86_64=("promptr-${pkgver}-x86_64.tar.gz::https://packages.toxdes.com/releases/promptr_${pkgver}_amd64.tar.gz")
12sha256sums_x86_64=('1a3166601657c71ee306390dd957f8aa251df0e0dd878b502dec91e8c709d221')
13
14source_aarch64=("promptr-${pkgver}-aarch64.tar.gz::https://packages.toxdes.com/releases/promptr_${pkgver}_arm64.tar.gz")
15sha256sums_aarch64=('667d3d71cb662f84f760a50df2ad7aa1aeac8b8474efe8345d3f139d354bdbbf')
16
17package() {
18 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/promptr-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.tar.gz" -C "${pkgdir}"
19}
20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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