puro-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer pwrshi 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from puro.dev, which is the official project domain for the puro Flutter version manager (GitHub: github.com/pingbird/puro). The domain is controlled by the upstream author (pingbird), so it is not a random personal host, but it is also not a standard forge release artifact (e.g., GitHub Releases). The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin/puro. There is a sha256sum provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not protect against the upstream author pushing a malicious binary at the same URL/version. The core concern is that puro.dev is a custom CDN/build server rather than a transparent release system like GitHub Releases where artifacts are immutably tied to a tagged commit. This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a custom host with no reproducibility guarantee. This pattern is standard for -bin AUR packages but the non-GitHub-Releases origin keeps it at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:7 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver::https://puro.dev/builds/$pkgver/linux-x64/puro")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from puro.dev, which is the official project domain for the puro Flutter version manager (GitHub: github.com/pingbird/puro). The domain is controlled by the upstream author (pingbird), so it is not a random personal host, but it is also not a standard forge release artifact (e.g., GitHub Releases). The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin/puro. There is a sha256sum provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not protect against the upstream author pushing a malicious binary at the same URL/version. The core concern is that puro.dev is a custom CDN/build server rather than a transparent release system like GitHub Releases where artifacts are immutably tied to a tagged commit. This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a custom host with no reproducibility guarantee. This pattern is standard for -bin AUR packages but the non-GitHub-Releases origin keeps it at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Stanislav Berezhnoy <me@pwrshi.ru>
    
      2pkgname=puro-bin
    
      3pkgver=1.4.11
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc='A powerful tool for installing and upgrading Flutter versions.'
    
      6url='https://github.com/pingbird/puro'
    
      7source=("$pkgname-$pkgver::https://puro.dev/builds/$pkgver/linux-x64/puro")
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9options=('!strip' '!debug')
    
      10license=('GPL-3.0-or-later')
    
      11depends=('git')
    
      12conflicts=('puro')
    
      13provides=('puro')
    
      14sha256sums=('be0e79875f30e2c9f48db20adb5443e02ec78068885c30f1a698513205b2668a')
    
      15
    
      16package() {
    
      17  install -Dm755 "$srcdir/puro-bin-$pkgver" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/puro"
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2