puro-bin

maintainer pwrshi · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from puro.dev, which is the official project domain for the puro Flutter version manager (GitHub: github.com/pingbird/puro). The domain is controlled by the upstream author (pingbird), so it is not a random personal host, but it is also not a standard forge release artifact (e.g., GitHub Releases). The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin/puro. There is a sha256sum provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not protect against the upstream author pushing a malicious binary at the same URL/version. The core concern is that puro.dev is a custom CDN/build server rather than a transparent release system like GitHub Releases where artifacts are immutably tied to a tagged commit. This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a custom host with no reproducibility guarantee. This pattern is standard for -bin AUR packages but the non-GitHub-Releases origin keeps it at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:7 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver::https://puro.dev/builds/$pkgver/linux-x64/puro")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from puro.dev, which is the official project domain for the puro Flutter version manager (GitHub: github.com/pingbird/puro). The domain is controlled by the upstream author (pingbird), so it is not a random personal host, but it is also not a standard forge release artifact (e.g., GitHub Releases). The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin/puro. There is a sha256sum provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at the point of download, but does not protect against the upstream author pushing a malicious binary at the same URL/version. The core concern is that puro.dev is a custom CDN/build server rather than a transparent release system like GitHub Releases where artifacts are immutably tied to a tagged commit. This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a custom host with no reproducibility guarantee. This pattern is standard for -bin AUR packages but the non-GitHub-Releases origin keeps it at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Stanislav Berezhnoy <me@pwrshi.ru>
    
      2pkgname=puro-bin
    
      3pkgver=1.4.11
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc='A powerful tool for installing and upgrading Flutter versions.'
    
      6url='https://github.com/pingbird/puro'
    
      7source=("$pkgname-$pkgver::https://puro.dev/builds/$pkgver/linux-x64/puro")
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9options=('!strip' '!debug')
    
      10license=('GPL-3.0-or-later')
    
      11depends=('git')
    
      12conflicts=('puro')
    
      13provides=('puro')
    
      14sha256sums=('be0e79875f30e2c9f48db20adb5443e02ec78068885c30f1a698513205b2668a')
    
      15
    
      16package() {
    
      17  install -Dm755 "$srcdir/puro-bin-$pkgver" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/puro"
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2