python-cad_to_openmc

maintainer LukeLabrie · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
LOW
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The source is pulled directly from the official upstream GitHub repository (openmsr/CAD_to_OpenMC) via git+https, which is the canonical location for this project. The SKIP checksum is normal for VCS sources. The main concern flagged is 'pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements.txt' inside the package() function. This is sloppy packaging practice: it installs dependencies outside pacman's control and writes to the live system rather than $pkgdir, but the requirements.txt comes from the same upstream git repository already cloned, so there is no separate untrusted fetch of unknown content. The pip invocation is a packaging quality issue (dependencies should be declared in depends/makedepends and installed properly), not a supply-chain attack vector introducing external untrusted binaries. The severity is low rather than medium because the executed code originates from the same official upstream source already fetched, not from a separate unofficial or personal host.

Triggered rules

LOW pip install of an external package pip_install_external

`pip install <package>` fetches an unpinned package from PyPI at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums. Severity reduced: python-* packages routinely use pip.

  • PKGBUILD:51 pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements.txt
LOW AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is LOW (confidence 82%): The source is pulled directly from the official upstream GitHub repository (openmsr/CAD_to_OpenMC) via git+https, which is the canonical location for this project. The SKIP checksum is normal for VCS sources. The main concern flagged is 'pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements.txt' inside the package() function. This is sloppy packaging practice: it installs dependencies outside pacman's control and writes to the live system rather than $pkgdir, but the requirements.txt comes from the same upstream git repository already cloned, so there is no separate untrusted fetch of unknown content. The pip invocation is a packaging quality issue (dependencies should be declared in depends/makedepends and installed properly), not a supply-chain attack vector introducing external untrusted binaries. The severity is low rather than medium because the executed code originates from the same official upstream source already fetched, not from a separate unofficial or personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Luke Labrie-Cleary <luke.cleary@copenhagenatomics.com>
2pkgname=python-cad_to_openmc
3pkgver=0.2.6.r9.gfba782c
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="code to target the conversion from a step-file to a h5m-geometry
6 for neutronics"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/openmsr/CAD_to_OpenMC"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=(
11 python
12 python-pip
13 moab-git
14 python-multimethod
15 python-typish
16 python-ezdxf
17 python-nptyping
18 nlopt
19 python-pymoab
20)
21
22makedepends=(
23 git
24 python
25 python-build
26 python-installer
27 python-wheel
28)
29
30_name="CAD_to_OpenMC"
31provides=("${_name%-pkgver}")
32source=("git+https://github.com/openmsr/CAD_to_OpenMC.git")
33md5sums=('SKIP')
34
35pkgver() {
36 cd "$srcdir/${_name}"
37 git describe --long --tags | sed 's/^v//;s/\([^-]*-g\)/r\1/;s/-/./g'
38}
39
40build() {
41 cd "$srcdir/${_name}"
42 python \
43 -m build \
44 --wheel \
45 --no-isolation
46 }
47
48package() {
49 cd "$srcdir/${_name}"
50 python -m installer --destdir="$pkgdir" dist/*.whl
51 pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements.txt
52
53 # make git repo available in opt
54 cd "$srcdir"
55 mkdir $pkgdir/opt
56 cp -r "$_name" $pkgdir/opt
57}
58
59

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 LOW 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 LOW 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 LOW 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 LOW 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 LOW 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 LOW 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 LOW 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 LOW 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 LOW 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 LOW 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 LOW 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 LOW 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 LOW 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 LOW 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 LOW 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 LOW 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 LOW 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 LOW 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 LOW 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 LOW 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion