python-dlib-cuda-git

maintainer miroslavasedlak · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
HIGH
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD executes a local script called 'compressor' with sudo (root) privileges in the build() function. This script is listed in the source array with 'SKIP' checksum verification, meaning it is never integrity-checked. Critically, there is no URL for this source - it appears to be a local file that must already exist on the system, which is highly suspicious. Additionally, the git repository for dlib itself is never cloned (no git+ URL in sources), yet pkgver() tries to cd into '${_pkgname}' directory. The combination of: (1) an unverified local script named 'compressor', (2) executed with sudo/root privileges, (3) with SKIP checksum, and (4) no legitimate source URL constitutes a genuine high-risk pattern consistent with malware or a backdoor. A legitimate PKGBUILD would never need to run an arbitrary local script as root to build a Python package.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM Recently orphaned & re-adopted orphaned_readopted

This package was orphaned and re-adopted within the last 30 days — a window where ownership transfers can introduce malicious changes.

HIGH AI review of an ambiguous pattern llm_review

The static rules found a suspicious pattern they could not resolve, so an AI model (anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6) reviewed it and judged it HIGH (confidence 95%): The PKGBUILD executes a local script called 'compressor' with sudo (root) privileges in the build() function. This script is listed in the source array with 'SKIP' checksum verification, meaning it is never integrity-checked. Critically, there is no URL for this source - it appears to be a local file that must already exist on the system, which is highly suspicious. Additionally, the git repository for dlib itself is never cloned (no git+ URL in sources), yet pkgver() tries to cd into '${_pkgname}' directory. The combination of: (1) an unverified local script named 'compressor', (2) executed with sudo/root privileges, (3) with SKIP checksum, and (4) no legitimate source URL constitutes a genuine high-risk pattern consistent with malware or a backdoor. A legitimate PKGBUILD would never need to run an arbitrary local script as root to build a Python package.

PKGBUILD

1# Maintainer: Aseem Athale <athaleaseem@gmail.com>
2
3_pkgname=dlib
4pkgname=python-${_pkgname}-cuda-git
5pkgver=20.0.r36.ga41c2e6
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Dlib is a general purpose cross-platform C++ library designed using contract programming and modern C++ techniques. -- git CUDA version"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="http://www.dlib.net/"
10license=('BSL-1.0')
11depends=('cblas' 'giflib' 'lapack' 'libjpeg-turbo' 'libpng' 'python' 'cuda' 'cudnn' 'ffmpeg')
12makedepends=('git' 'boost' 'python-setuptools' 'sqlite' 'ccache-ext' 'python-build' 'python-installer' 'python-wheel' 'python-cmake')
13optdepends=('sqlite')
14provides=('python-dlib' 'python-dlib-cuda')
15options=(!lto)
16conflicts=('python-dlib' 'python-dlib-cuda' 'python-dlib-git')
17source=(
18 'compressor'
19)
20b2sums=(
21 'SKIP'
22)
23
24pkgver() {
25 cd "${_pkgname}"
26 git describe --long --tags --abbrev=7 | sed 's/^v//;s/\([^-]*-g\)/r\1/;s/-/./g'
27}
28
29build(){
30 sudo "$srcdir/compressor"
31 cd "${_pkgname}"
32 DLIB_USE_CUDA=ON python -m build --wheel --no-isolation
33}
34
35package(){
36 cd "${_pkgname}"
37 python -m installer --destdir="${pkgdir}" dist/*.whl
38}
39
40

Changes since previous scan

--- PKGBUILD @ 2026-06-18 16:11
+++ PKGBUILD @ 2026-08-03 00:08
@@ -14,8 +14,12 @@
provides=('python-dlib' 'python-dlib-cuda')
options=(!lto)
conflicts=('python-dlib' 'python-dlib-cuda' 'python-dlib-git')
-source=("git+https://github.com/davisking/dlib.git")
-b2sums=('SKIP')
+source=(
+ 'compressor'
+)
+b2sums=(
+ 'SKIP'
+)
pkgver() {
cd "${_pkgname}"
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@
}
build(){
+ sudo "$srcdir/compressor"
cd "${_pkgname}"
DLIB_USE_CUDA=ON python -m build --wheel --no-isolation
}
@@ -32,3 +37,4 @@
python -m installer --destdir="${pkgdir}" dist/*.whl
}
+

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 HIGH 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 HIGH 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 HIGH 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 19:16:23 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 17:24:09 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 17:15:21 HIGH 2
2026-06-18 16:11:54 CLEAN 0

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