python-mkl-fft-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Python extension using Intel MKL) from repo.anaconda.com, which is Anaconda's official package repository. While Anaconda is a legitimate and well-known distribution channel, the package installs a prebuilt binary (not source-compiled) from a non-Arch host. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk at the transport level, but the binary's provenance and build reproducibility cannot be independently verified. The prefix-replacement sed operation on the installed binary is a standard Anaconda relocation technique, not malicious. The overall pattern — pinned hash, official Anaconda repo, known upstream (IntelPython/mkl_fft on GitHub) — makes this a legitimate but non-standard packaging approach. The medium rating is appropriate: it's not an attack, but installing prebuilt binaries from a non-Arch source into the Python path is a genuine supply-chain concern if Anaconda's infrastructure were compromised or the package were silently updated.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:17 source=("https://repo.anaconda.com/pkgs/main/linux-64/${_pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${_build}.tar.bz2")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a compiled Python extension using Intel MKL) from repo.anaconda.com, which is Anaconda's official package repository. While Anaconda is a legitimate and well-known distribution channel, the package installs a prebuilt binary (not source-compiled) from a non-Arch host. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk at the transport level, but the binary's provenance and build reproducibility cannot be independently verified. The prefix-replacement sed operation on the installed binary is a standard Anaconda relocation technique, not malicious. The overall pattern — pinned hash, official Anaconda repo, known upstream (IntelPython/mkl_fft on GitHub) — makes this a legitimate but non-standard packaging approach. The medium rating is appropriate: it's not an attack, but installing prebuilt binaries from a non-Arch source into the Python path is a genuine supply-chain concern if Anaconda's infrastructure were compromised or the package were silently updated.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer  : Chris Billington <chrisjbillington@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=python-mkl-fft-bin
    
      3_pkgname=mkl_fft
    
      4_pkgver=1.3.6
    
      5_build=py311ha02d727_1
    
      6pkgver="${_pkgver}.anaconda${_build##*_}"
    
      7pkgrel=3
    
      8epoch=1
    
      9pkgdesc="Fast Fourier Transform using Intel MKL - prebuilt binaries from Anaconda"
    
      10arch=('x86_64')
    
      11url="https://github.com/IntelPython/mkl_fft"
    
      12license=('custom')
    
      13provides=('python-mkl-fft')
    
      14conflicts=('python-mkl-fft')
    
      15depends=('python-mkl-service' 'python-numpy')
    
      16makedepends=('jq')
    
      17source=("https://repo.anaconda.com/pkgs/main/linux-64/${_pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${_build}.tar.bz2")
    
      18sha256sums=('ca708f0195f2e0320f7bc11e3a7adea84a61fc7419bd7c563fcac77cf2a9ea2a')
    
      19
    
      20prepare() {
    
      21  # Prefix replacement
    
      22  for row in $(jq -c '.paths[] | select(has("prefix_placeholder"))' "info/paths.json"); do
    
      23    path=$(echo $row | jq -r '._path')
    
      24    prefix=$(echo $row | jq -r '.prefix_placeholder')
    
      25    sed -i "s:${prefix}:/usr:g" "${path}"
    
      26  done
    
      27}
    
      28
    
      29package() {
    
      30  mkdir "${pkgdir}/usr"
    
      31  cp -drp --no-preserve=ownership "${srcdir}/lib" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
    
      32  install -D -m 644 "${srcdir}/info/licenses/LICENSE.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      33}
    
      34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2