qalvpn

maintainer tbhaxor · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.qalvpn.com (the vendor's own subdomain, not a third-party host), extracts it with ar/tar, and installs it directly. This is a standard pattern for proprietary software distributed as .deb files in the AUR. The host appears to be the official vendor domain (qalvpn.com), so it is not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the integrity check uses only MD5 (cryptographically broken, no SHA256/b2), there is no GPG signature verification, and the installed artifact is a closed-source prebuilt binary with no way to audit its contents. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the vendor's server is compromised or the binary is silently updated, users receive unverified executable code. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious — it is the standard medium-risk pattern for unverified prebuilt proprietary binaries from a vendor host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://web.qalvpn.com/apps/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.qalvpn.com (the vendor's own subdomain, not a third-party host), extracts it with ar/tar, and installs it directly. This is a standard pattern for proprietary software distributed as .deb files in the AUR. The host appears to be the official vendor domain (qalvpn.com), so it is not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the integrity check uses only MD5 (cryptographically broken, no SHA256/b2), there is no GPG signature verification, and the installed artifact is a closed-source prebuilt binary with no way to audit its contents. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the vendor's server is compromised or the binary is silently updated, users receive unverified executable code. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious — it is the standard medium-risk pattern for unverified prebuilt proprietary binaries from a vendor host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Gurkirat Singh <tbhaxor@proton.me>
2
3pkgname=qalvpn
4pkgver=1.2.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="QAL VPN is a post-quantum VPN service to protect you against the future of computing: quantum computers"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://www.qalvpn.com"
9depends=('nss' 'binutils')
10license=('custom')
11source=("https://web.qalvpn.com/apps/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb")
12md5sums=('885aae63f0fea2f1440455d8424cb558')
13
14package() {
15 ar x "${srcdir}/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb"
16 tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
17 mv "$pkgdir/opt/QAL VPN" "$pkgdir/opt/qalvpn"
18}
19
20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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