qalvpn

MEDIUM
maintainer tbhaxor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.qalvpn.com (the vendor's own subdomain, not a third-party host), extracts it with ar/tar, and installs it directly. This is a standard pattern for proprietary software distributed as .deb files in the AUR. The host appears to be the official vendor domain (qalvpn.com), so it is not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the integrity check uses only MD5 (cryptographically broken, no SHA256/b2), there is no GPG signature verification, and the installed artifact is a closed-source prebuilt binary with no way to audit its contents. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the vendor's server is compromised or the binary is silently updated, users receive unverified executable code. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious — it is the standard medium-risk pattern for unverified prebuilt proprietary binaries from a vendor host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://web.qalvpn.com/apps/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.qalvpn.com (the vendor's own subdomain, not a third-party host), extracts it with ar/tar, and installs it directly. This is a standard pattern for proprietary software distributed as .deb files in the AUR. The host appears to be the official vendor domain (qalvpn.com), so it is not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the integrity check uses only MD5 (cryptographically broken, no SHA256/b2), there is no GPG signature verification, and the installed artifact is a closed-source prebuilt binary with no way to audit its contents. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the vendor's server is compromised or the binary is silently updated, users receive unverified executable code. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious — it is the standard medium-risk pattern for unverified prebuilt proprietary binaries from a vendor host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Gurkirat Singh <tbhaxor@proton.me>
2
3pkgname=qalvpn
4pkgver=1.2.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="QAL VPN is a post-quantum VPN service to protect you against the future of computing: quantum computers"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://www.qalvpn.com"
9depends=('nss' 'binutils')
10license=('custom')
11source=("https://web.qalvpn.com/apps/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb")
12md5sums=('885aae63f0fea2f1440455d8424cb558')
13
14package() {
15 ar x "${srcdir}/qalvpn${pkgver}.deb"
16 tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
17 mv "$pkgdir/opt/QAL VPN" "$pkgdir/opt/qalvpn"
18}
19
20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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