qcopy

MEDIUM

maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz) from a personal domain (concise.cc) owned by the maintainer, rather than from the project's official GitLab release infrastructure. While the maintainer controls both the domain and the GitLab repo, distributing a prebuilt binary from a personal host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, users receive an arbitrary binary. The package installs an executable to /usr/bin/qcopy. There is a sha512sum and a PGP key listed, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk (the PGP key's trustworthiness depends on the maintainer). The arch=(any) designation is also suspicious for a binary package. Overall this is a real medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (pkg.tar.xz) from a personal domain (concise.cc) owned by the maintainer, rather than from the project's official GitLab release infrastructure. While the maintainer controls both the domain and the GitLab repo, distributing a prebuilt binary from a personal host rather than building from source is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, users receive an arbitrary binary. The package installs an executable to /usr/bin/qcopy. There is a sha512sum and a PGP key listed, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk (the PGP key's trustworthiness depends on the maintainer). The arch=(any) designation is also suspicious for a binary package. Overall this is a real medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
    
      2# ---
    
      3pkgname=qcopy
    
      4pkgver=2.0.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Easily save important snippets such as passwords for quick access copying at any point"
    
      7arch=(any)
    
      8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=(fzf dialog xsel bat xdotool)
    
      11install="qcopy.install"
    
      12source=(
    
      13  "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
    
      14)
    
      15sha512sums=(
    
      16  '1609ab96821abab32bb82c46d1dc30dac14f80f7b08654ba67895cc4bca72b563fdb2a08fe2d7e4494339766983202daefc994c410d58687d0df3b7cd31869c0'
    
      17  )
    
      18md5sums=(
    
      19  '9d279e2db31df2e6b72ffebaa3a0a69f'
    
      20  )
    
      21validpgpkeys=(
    
      22  '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
    
      23  )
    
      24
    
      25package() {
    
      26
    
      27  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" ||
    
      28  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
    
      29
    
      30  install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      31  install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      32  install -Dm644 usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz "${pkgdir}/usr/share/man/man1/${pkgname}.1.gz"
    
      33
    
      34}
    
      35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2