qtalk-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from qim.qunar.com, which is Qunar's own infrastructure (Qunar is a major Chinese travel company and QTalk is their internal/external IM client). The binary is extracted and installed to /opt/qtalk. While qim.qunar.com appears to be the official vendor host, the source URL is not versioned/pinned (it fetches 'qtalk_setup_linux.run' without a version in the path, meaning the sha256sum provides the only integrity check against substitution). The package installs prebuilt binaries including shared libraries and executables directly to /opt. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: it's a prebuilt binary from what appears to be the official vendor host, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum could become stale if the file is updated server-side, and there's no GPG signature verification. The risk is real but not indicative of malice — this is standard 'bin' package practice with the usual supply-chain caveats of trusting a vendor's binary distribution.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("qtalk_linux_$pkgver.bin::https://qim.qunar.com/win_2_0/downloads/qtalk_setup_linux.run"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from qim.qunar.com, which is Qunar's own infrastructure (Qunar is a major Chinese travel company and QTalk is their internal/external IM client). The binary is extracted and installed to /opt/qtalk. While qim.qunar.com appears to be the official vendor host, the source URL is not versioned/pinned (it fetches 'qtalk_setup_linux.run' without a version in the path, meaning the sha256sum provides the only integrity check against substitution). The package installs prebuilt binaries including shared libraries and executables directly to /opt. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: it's a prebuilt binary from what appears to be the official vendor host, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum could become stale if the file is updated server-side, and there's no GPG signature verification. The risk is real but not indicative of malice — this is standard 'bin' package practice with the usual supply-chain caveats of trusting a vendor's binary distribution.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: lightning1141 <lightning1141@gmail.com>
pkgname=qtalk-bin
pkgver=2.1.010
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="QTalk (Window/Linux) 2.0 by Qunar"
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://qim.qunar.com"
license=('custom')
conflicts=('qtalk')
provides=('qtalk')
makedepends=('tar')
depends=('qt5-base' 'qt5-webengine' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-x11extras' 'qt5-quickcontrols' 'qt5-svg')
source=("qtalk_linux_$pkgver.bin::https://qim.qunar.com/win_2_0/downloads/qtalk_setup_linux.run"
"com.qunar.QTalk.desktop"
"qunarim.png"
)
sha256sums=("26f4a5145e7d46e3dfff164655c2aab07f9375a5ecb2985786c9b1c3e4fb810c"
"0b827bc0ee931fc3c53d2bcf36cfef656dfbadf3b731d61ef75db628d5b5b1de"
"2334ea114a2949301d583051cdb64c5c8186aaa8fc9f402ecd04decbaf775128"
)
build() {
msg "Extracting QTalk archive ..."
tail +10 qtalk_linux_$pkgver.bin > QTalk.tar.bz2
tar -jxvf QTalk.tar.bz2 -C "${srcdir}/"
cp "com.qunar.QTalk.desktop" "${srcdir}/QTalk/com.qunar.QTalk.desktop"
cp "qunarim.png" "${srcdir}/QTalk/qunarim.png"
}
package() {
msg "Preparing icons ..."
install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
install -m644 "${srcdir}/QTalk/com.qunar.QTalk.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
msg "Copying QTalk to /opt/qtalk..."
install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/qtalk"
cp -a ${srcdir}/QTalk/bin "${pkgdir}/opt/qtalk/bin"
cp -a ${srcdir}/QTalk/res "${pkgdir}/opt/qtalk/res"
cp -a ${srcdir}/QTalk/qunarim.png "${pkgdir}/opt/qtalk/qunarim.png"
install -m755 "${srcdir}/QTalk/res/run.sh" "${pkgdir}/opt/qtalk/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |