quickapp-ide

maintainer junyussh · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from statres.quickapp.cn (the official CDN for the Quick App Alliance, a Chinese industry consortium), extracts it with ar/tar, and copies the entire contents directly into the package root. This is a real supply-chain concern: (1) the host is not a well-known, audited package repository; (2) there is no GPG/SHA256 verification, only MD5 checksums which are weak; (3) the binary is executed as installed software without any source build. However, this pattern is common in AUR for proprietary Linux software distributed only as .deb (e.g. many Chinese vendor tools), and statres.quickapp.cn appears to be the legitimate vendor CDN for quickapp.cn. The .docx is used only as a license file (pure data, not executed). The risk is real but consistent with a medium-severity supply-chain concern rather than an active attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:21 "https://statres.quickapp.cn/quickapp/ide/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from statres.quickapp.cn (the official CDN for the Quick App Alliance, a Chinese industry consortium), extracts it with ar/tar, and copies the entire contents directly into the package root. This is a real supply-chain concern: (1) the host is not a well-known, audited package repository; (2) there is no GPG/SHA256 verification, only MD5 checksums which are weak; (3) the binary is executed as installed software without any source build. However, this pattern is common in AUR for proprietary Linux software distributed only as .deb (e.g. many Chinese vendor tools), and statres.quickapp.cn appears to be the legitimate vendor CDN for quickapp.cn. The .docx is used only as a license file (pure data, not executed). The risk is real but consistent with a medium-severity supply-chain concern rather than an active attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Chun Yu <junyussh@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=quickapp-ide
    
      3pkgver=1.5.0
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="quick app IDE for linux"
    
      6arch=("i386" "x86_64")
    
      7url="https://www.quickapp.cn/docCenter/IDEPublicity"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9groups=()
    
      10depends=(fontconfig libxtst gtk3 python cairo alsa-lib nss gcc-libs libnotify libxss 'glibc>=2.28-4' lsof which)
    
      11makedepends=()
    
      12optdepends=()
    
      13provides=()
    
      14conflicts=()
    
      15replaces=()
    
      16backup=()
    
      17options=()
    
      18install=
    
      19changelog=
    
      20source=(
    
      21  "https://statres.quickapp.cn/quickapp/ide/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
    
      22  "https://statres.quickapp.cn/quickapp/quickapp/201809/file/201809171830002525474.docx"
    
      23)
    
      24noextract=()
    
      25md5sums=('22a380224d2d50b7b2d0f206cc6850e2'
    
      26         '8d634c0f6d214e6cbacdae6b94f3ddae')
    
      27
    
      28prepare() {
    
      29  ar -x ${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb
    
      30  mkdir ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
    
      31	tar -xf data.tar.xz --directory="${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
    
      32}
    
      33
    
      34package() {
    
      35  install -Dm 644 201809171830002525474.docx "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE.docx"
    
      36  cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
    
      37  # install -d opt/quickAppIDE
    
      38  # cp  opt/quickAppIDE ${pkgdir}
    
      39  # make DESTDIR="$pkgdir/" install
    
      40  cp -r ./ ${pkgdir}/
    
      41}
    
      42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2