quill-chat
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary (an Electron app) from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (storage.googleapis.com) under the quill.chat project namespace and installs it directly. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums='SKIP' means there is no integrity verification whatsoever — the binary could be silently replaced or updated at any time without the PKGBUILD reflecting the change, making reproducibility impossible and supply-chain substitution undetectable; (2) the source is a mutable 'Latest' URL (Quill-Latest.rpm) rather than a versioned/pinned artifact, so the downloaded content may not match pkgver=2020.09.18 at any given time. The host itself (storage.googleapis.com/app-releases-dl.quill.chat) is plausibly the official vendor distribution channel for Quill, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary, no checksum, and a floating 'Latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=('https://storage.googleapis.com/app-releases-dl.quill.chat/linux/Quill-Latest.rpm')
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary (an Electron app) from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (storage.googleapis.com) under the quill.chat project namespace and installs it directly. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums='SKIP' means there is no integrity verification whatsoever — the binary could be silently replaced or updated at any time without the PKGBUILD reflecting the change, making reproducibility impossible and supply-chain substitution undetectable; (2) the source is a mutable 'Latest' URL (Quill-Latest.rpm) rather than a versioned/pinned artifact, so the downloaded content may not match pkgver=2020.09.18 at any given time. The host itself (storage.googleapis.com/app-releases-dl.quill.chat) is plausibly the official vendor distribution channel for Quill, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary, no checksum, and a floating 'Latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: tekacs <pkg@tekacs.com>
pkgname=quill-chat
pkgver=2020.09.18
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Quill - Messaging for groups and teams that stay focused'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://quill.chat/"
license=('Proprietary')
options=('!emptydirs' '!strip')
depends=('at-spi2-core' 'gtk3' 'libxtst' 'libnotify' 'nss' 'xdg-utils')
optdepends=('ttf-ms-win10: emoji support')
source=('https://storage.googleapis.com/app-releases-dl.quill.chat/linux/Quill-Latest.rpm')
sha256sums=('SKIP')
package() (
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/"
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
cp -r "${srcdir}/opt/." "${pkgdir}/opt/"
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/." "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/share/." "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
)
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-02 00:26:00 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |