r-linux
The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary x86 binaries (.deb files) from r-studio.com, which is the official vendor site for R-TT's R-Studio/R-Linux products (r-tt.com is the product page, r-studio.com is the download host — both are operated by the same vendor). The sha512sums are pinned for both architecture variants, providing integrity verification. However, the binaries are closed-source, precompiled executables installed directly into /opt, with no source build. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: not an attack, but a supply-chain concern because users must trust the vendor's binary and the pinned hashes. The host is the official vendor download server, not a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) the concern. The PKGBUILD also modifies the extracted launcher script and injects elevate.sh, which is a local file included in the source array with a pinned hash — this is acceptable. Overall this is a standard 'binary repackage from official vendor' pattern common in AUR, rated medium due to executed closed-source binaries rather than any active malice.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source_i686=("$pkgname-$pkgver-i386.deb::"https://www.r-studio.com/downloads/RLinux6_i386.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary x86 binaries (.deb files) from r-studio.com, which is the official vendor site for R-TT's R-Studio/R-Linux products (r-tt.com is the product page, r-studio.com is the download host — both are operated by the same vendor). The sha512sums are pinned for both architecture variants, providing integrity verification. However, the binaries are closed-source, precompiled executables installed directly into /opt, with no source build. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: not an attack, but a supply-chain concern because users must trust the vendor's binary and the pinned hashes. The host is the official vendor download server, not a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) the concern. The PKGBUILD also modifies the extracted launcher script and injects elevate.sh, which is a local file included in the source array with a pinned hash — this is acceptable. Overall this is a standard 'binary repackage from official vendor' pattern common in AUR, rated medium due to executed closed-source binaries rather than any active malice.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: mrxx <mrxx at cyberhome dot at>
# Contributor: Jean Lucas <jean@4ray.co>
pkgname=r-linux
pkgver=6.5.191754
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="File recovery utility for the ext2/ext3/ext4 file system"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="https://www.r-tt.com/data_recovery_linux/"
license=('custom')
depends=('xorg-xhost')
optdepends=('gksu' 'kdesu' 'polkit')
source_i686=("$pkgname-$pkgver-i386.deb::"https://www.r-studio.com/downloads/RLinux6_i386.deb)
source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x64.deb::https://www.r-studio.com/downloads/RLinux6_x64.deb")
source=('rlinux.sh' 'elevate.sh')
sha512sums=('01ea9c642f46a35a9b90896a7b93c3b03a5256100d6a1443286a5da58fcdca0c49447a48a2a6c335ab334cb53965ed4269381ecdda94af39d2f3c8542ce2cbae'
'a98ab704660e17f062ffa75a4e326da600fb7f6af4518dadfbb7e42673b86a521e825ab81dd28995fcf375bd609fe1522a8a48d884fe7433c8b4c2022307cb32')
sha512sums_i686=('4fa85dcdaa37fcb36c1b5fa401c589aa89dd27121d15706bb06c1c0542bafc1acac085bbff6c14e1aae108307d8825baf2f483fa5a2b8da72d5afbf5272cb919')
sha512sums_x86_64=('f2ffff9d531c32154167742454b06392eecf8e93c6754879e1f8dd69fd81b8cccf1d8c00341644bf096e13230d7499f68536adde6ea8be6e28248760181ba177')
prepare() {
bsdtar xf data.tar.gz
}
package() {
install -d "$pkgdir"/opt
install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications
install -Dm 755 rlinux.sh "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/rlinux
cp -r usr/local/R-Linux "$pkgdir"/opt/
head -n -12 usr/local/R-Linux/bin/rlinux >"$pkgdir"/opt/R-Linux/bin/rlinux
cat elevate.sh >>"$pkgdir"/opt/R-Linux/bin/rlinux
sed -i 's|/usr/local|/opt|' "$pkgdir"/opt/R-Linux/bin/rlinux
cd usr/local/R-Linux/share
install -Dm 644 logo_48.png "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/rtt-rlinux.png
sed 's|/usr/local|/opt|' rtt-rlinux.desktop >"$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/rtt-rlinux.desktop
install -Dm644 rln_viewer.txt "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |