radboard-bin
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("radboard-${pkgver}.deb::https://dl.mikolajczyk.org/radboard/v${pkgver}/radboard-amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from dl.mikolajczyk.org, which is a personal domain operated by the maintainer (same surname/domain as the package author). This is a classic -bin AUR pattern where the maintainer self-hosts their own application's release artifacts. The sha256sum is present and pins the specific binary. However, the host is not an official distribution channel (e.g., GitHub Releases, a distro mirror), so if the personal domain were compromised or the TLS certificate hijacked, a malicious binary could be substituted. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the package root (cp -a usr), meaning it executes with user privileges at runtime. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an unofficial personal host serving an executed binary with no additional verification (no GPG signature). The cheaper model's assessment is correct here.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikołaj Mikołajczyk <mikolajczyk.mikolajm@gmail.com>
pkgname=radboard-bin
pkgver=0.8.6
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Desktop Kanban board for Radicle"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://radboard.mikolajczyk.org"
license=('MIT')
provides=('radboard')
conflicts=('radboard')
depends=('webkit2gtk-4.1' 'gtk3' 'libappindicator-gtk3' 'librsvg' 'openssl')
options=('!strip' '!debug')
source=("radboard-${pkgver}.deb::https://dl.mikolajczyk.org/radboard/v${pkgver}/radboard-amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('26fe2e4d2729b02de7ae0d14c8ebb72e7282421dafed95069027de3270ce9aef')
prepare() {
cd "$srcdir"
bsdtar -xf "radboard-${pkgver}.deb"
if [ -f data.tar.zst ]; then
bsdtar -xf data.tar.zst
elif [ -f data.tar.xz ]; then
bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz
else
bsdtar -xf data.tar.gz
fi
}
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
cp -a usr "$pkgdir/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |