raidar

MEDIUM
maintainer baosen 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: bao <chibaosen at gmail dot com>
2
3pkgname=raidar
4pkgver=6.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="RAIDar is used to discover NETGEAR Storage on your local network."
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8url="http://kb.netgear.com/20684/ReadyNAS-Downloads"
9license=('GPL')
10depends=('glibc' 'java-runtime')
11source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
12md5sums=('40cfb3a54629335f319f2fedc9d1accf')
13
14package() {
15 tar xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
16}
17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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