raidar
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: bao <chibaosen at gmail dot com>
pkgname=raidar
pkgver=6.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="RAIDar is used to discover NETGEAR Storage on your local network."
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://kb.netgear.com/20684/ReadyNAS-Downloads"
license=('GPL')
depends=('glibc' 'java-runtime')
source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('40cfb3a54629335f319f2fedc9d1accf')
package() {
tar xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |