raidar
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from readynas.com (a NETGEAR-affiliated domain) and installs it directly. The concern is real but moderate: (1) it's a prebuilt binary with no signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and collision-prone); (2) readynas.com is a legitimate NETGEAR subdomain for their ReadyNAS product line, making this an official vendor host rather than a personal/unofficial one; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly into pkgdir without source build. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible — installing an unverified prebuilt binary with only MD5 is a genuine supply-chain concern — but the host is the official vendor domain, which reduces the risk somewhat. The pattern of extracting data.tar.xz from a .deb and placing it directly into pkgdir is standard AUR practice for proprietary binary packages. Overall this remains a medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification only.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: bao <chibaosen at gmail dot com>
pkgname=raidar
pkgver=6.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="RAIDar is used to discover NETGEAR Storage on your local network."
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://kb.netgear.com/20684/ReadyNAS-Downloads"
license=('GPL')
depends=('glibc' 'java-runtime')
source=("http://www.readynas.com/download/RAIDar/raidar_6.1-1.1_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('40cfb3a54629335f319f2fedc9d1accf')
package() {
tar xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |