raidgrep-bin

maintainer networkjanitor · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a precompiled binary from kingdread.de, which is a personal domain rather than the project's official GitLab release infrastructure (gitlab.com/dunj3/raidgrep). While the SHA256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, it does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary at any time (the checksum would simply be updated). The binary is executed directly on the user's system (install -Dm 755). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if kingdread.de is compromised or the owner is malicious, users receive and execute arbitrary code. The correct pattern would be to source releases from the official GitLab releases page. Severity remains MEDIUM — not HIGH because there is no evidence of active malice, just an unofficial hosting location for an executed binary.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 "https://kingdread.de/raidgrep/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a precompiled binary from kingdread.de, which is a personal domain rather than the project's official GitLab release infrastructure (gitlab.com/dunj3/raidgrep). While the SHA256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, it does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary at any time (the checksum would simply be updated). The binary is executed directly on the user's system (install -Dm 755). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if kingdread.de is compromised or the owner is malicious, users receive and execute arbitrary code. The correct pattern would be to source releases from the official GitLab releases page. Severity remains MEDIUM — not HIGH because there is no evidence of active malice, just an unofficial hosting location for an executed binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: networkjanitor <networkjanitor@xyooz.net>
2pkgname=raidgrep-bin
3_pkgname=${pkgname/-bin/}
4pkgver="1.5.0"
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Guild Wars 2/arcdps evtc log searching tool. Pre-compiled."
7arch=("x86_64")
8url="https://gitlab.com/dunj3/raidgrep"
9license=("GPL")
10provides=("raidgrep")
11conflicts=("raidgrep" "raidgrep-git")
12depends=("gcc-libs")
13source=(
14 "https://kingdread.de/raidgrep/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz"
15)
16sha256sums=('8be605d8e2deb0615e70ab086c9b59b80699130fe25658c1d6de89bd60343633')
17
18package() {
19 install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
20 install -Dm 755 ${_pkgname} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${_pkgname}
21 install -Dm 644 "${_pkgname}.1" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/man/man1/${_pkgname}.1"
22}
23
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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