ramses-git

maintainer florinacabello · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
HIGH
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD lists a local file 'indexer' as its only source with 'SKIP' checksum verification, then executes it with 'sudo' during the build() phase. This is a genuine high-risk pattern: (1) the actual git repository for ramses is never cloned in any prepare() step - there is no git+https:// source entry, only this opaque local 'indexer' script; (2) the script runs with elevated privileges via sudo with no integrity check; (3) the content of 'indexer' is completely unknown and unauditable from this PKGBUILD alone. The cmake build that follows references $srcdir/$_name which would only exist if 'indexer' clones it, meaning the entire source acquisition is delegated to this unverified privileged script. This constitutes a clear RCE/privilege-escalation risk regardless of whether the script is actually malicious - the pattern itself is an attack vector. A legitimate PKGBUILD for GENIVI/ramses would use a git+https:// source entry and would never require sudo.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM Recently orphaned & re-adopted orphaned_readopted

This package was orphaned and re-adopted within the last 30 days — a window where ownership transfers can introduce malicious changes.

HIGH AI review of an ambiguous pattern llm_review

The static rules found a suspicious pattern they could not resolve, so an AI model (anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6) reviewed it and judged it HIGH (confidence 95%): The PKGBUILD lists a local file 'indexer' as its only source with 'SKIP' checksum verification, then executes it with 'sudo' during the build() phase. This is a genuine high-risk pattern: (1) the actual git repository for ramses is never cloned in any prepare() step - there is no git+https:// source entry, only this opaque local 'indexer' script; (2) the script runs with elevated privileges via sudo with no integrity check; (3) the content of 'indexer' is completely unknown and unauditable from this PKGBUILD alone. The cmake build that follows references $srcdir/$_name which would only exist if 'indexer' clones it, meaning the entire source acquisition is delegated to this unverified privileged script. This constitutes a clear RCE/privilege-escalation risk regardless of whether the script is actually malicious - the pattern itself is an attack vector. A legitimate PKGBUILD for GENIVI/ramses would use a git+https:// source entry and would never require sudo.

PKGBUILD

1# Maintainer: Daniel W. S. Almeida <dwlsalmeida at gmail dot com>
2
3_name=ramses
4pkgname=$_name-git
5pkgver=r166.068163a64
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='A distributed system for rendering 3D content with focus on bandwidth and resource efficiency'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://github.com/GENIVI/ramses'
10license=('MPL2')
11depends=('lz4' 'harfbuzz' 'libx11' 'mesa' 'python' 'wayland')
12
13makedepends=('bash' 'cmake' 'git' 'ninja' 'ragel')
14provides=('ramses')
15source=(
16 'indexer'
17)
18
19sha512sums=(
20 'SKIP'
21)
22
23pkgver() {
24 cd "$_name"
25 printf "r%s.%s" "$(git rev-list --count HEAD)" "$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
26}
27
28build() {
29 sudo "$srcdir/indexer"
30 cd ${srcdir}/$_name
31 git submodule update --init --recursive
32
33 cmake \
34 -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
35 -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX:PATH=$pkgdir/usr \
36 -Dramses-sdk_BUILD_TESTS=0 \
37 -Dramses-sdk_BUILD_SMOKE_TESTS=0 \
38 -Dramses-sdk_BUILD_EXAMPLES=0 \
39 -Dramses-sdk_ENABLE_WAYLAND_SHELL=1 \
40 -Dramses-sdk_ENABLE_DLT=0 \
41 -G Ninja \
42 -Wno-dev \
43 ${srcdir}/$_name
44
45 cmake --build ${srcdir}/$_name
46}
47
48package() {
49 cd ${srcdir}/$_name
50 cmake --build ${srcdir}/$_name --target install
51}
52
53

Changes since previous scan

--- PKGBUILD @ 2026-07-20 21:14
+++ PKGBUILD @ 2026-08-03 00:08
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@
makedepends=('bash' 'cmake' 'git' 'ninja' 'ragel')
provides=('ramses')
-source=('git+https://github.com/GENIVI/ramses.git')
+source=(
+ 'indexer'
+)
-sha512sums=('SKIP')
+sha512sums=(
+ 'SKIP'
+)
pkgver() {
cd "$_name"
@@ -22,6 +26,7 @@
}
build() {
+ sudo "$srcdir/indexer"
cd ${srcdir}/$_name
git submodule update --init --recursive
@@ -45,3 +50,4 @@
cmake --build ${srcdir}/$_name --target install
}
+

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 HIGH 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 HIGH 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 HIGH 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 23:19:23 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 23:17:02 HIGH 2
2026-07-30 17:15:21 MEDIUM 1
2026-07-20 21:14:52 CLEAN 0
2026-06-18 16:11:54 CLEAN 0

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