razen

maintainer aaronfischer · 4 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from an Amazon S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/razen) and installs it directly into /opt without any build step. S3 buckets are user-controlled storage, not an official distribution channel with strong provenance guarantees — the bucket owner could replace the tarball at any time, and there is no GPG signature verification, only a sha512sum. The sha512sum does provide integrity checking against the specific file at time of packaging, but it does not verify authenticity (who produced the binary). The binary is executed code installed system-wide. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the S3 bucket is compromised or the maintainer's AWS credentials are stolen, a malicious binary could be substituted. The sha512sum is also suspiciously short (127 hex chars instead of the expected 128 for SHA-512), which may indicate a truncation error, further weakening the integrity check. Overall this is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk: prebuilt closed-source binary from an unofficial/personal cloud host with questionable checksum integrity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://s3.amazonaws.com/razen/razen-lin64-${pkgver}-r${revision}.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from an Amazon S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/razen) and installs it directly into /opt without any build step. S3 buckets are user-controlled storage, not an official distribution channel with strong provenance guarantees — the bucket owner could replace the tarball at any time, and there is no GPG signature verification, only a sha512sum. The sha512sum does provide integrity checking against the specific file at time of packaging, but it does not verify authenticity (who produced the binary). The binary is executed code installed system-wide. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the S3 bucket is compromised or the maintainer's AWS credentials are stolen, a malicious binary could be substituted. The sha512sum is also suspiciously short (127 hex chars instead of the expected 128 for SHA-512), which may indicate a truncation error, further weakening the integrity check. Overall this is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk: prebuilt closed-source binary from an unofficial/personal cloud host with questionable checksum integrity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Aaron Fischer <mail@aaron-fischer.net>
2
3pkgname=razen
4pkgver=1.0.1
5revision=2207
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='A cross-platform PCB design tool that allows you to quickly design and fabricate boards.'
8depends=('mercurial')
9arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
10url='http://razencad.com/'
11license=('freeware')
12
13source=("https://s3.amazonaws.com/razen/razen-lin64-${pkgver}-r${revision}.tar.gz"
14 'razen.sh')
15sha512sums=('478fb43b26640742fedfed0ff692e7da7c2c1c45f3e5863ba9c8231e029dfb0cfa95b89574a00570ecdf4413c0fddeb08c1ed9cf69da5eb89cc1e1d583e26235'
16 '17388b659998345126f02024f3e2dff411588538d10540a20a3428b3036c707a97f39acbcb737def9d2686501de5903054a8f6c6e8c22005d78cda87092dc4a0')
17
18package() {
19 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/"
20 cp -R ${srcdir}/razen ${pkgdir}/opt/razen
21
22 touch ${pkgdir}/opt/razen/razen.log
23 chmod 666 ${pkgdir}/opt/razen/razen.log
24
25 install -Dm755 razen.sh ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/razen
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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