rdworks-wine-bin

maintainer aiyion · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
LOW
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The source is downloaded directly from the official vendor domain (en.rd-acs.com), which is the same domain listed in the package's url= field. The RAR archive contains a Windows installer (RDWorksV8Setup8.01.18.exe) that is installed as a data file under /usr/share and then presumably run via Wine through the wrapper script. The wrapper script itself is checksummed. The md5sums are weak but present. The host is the official vendor site, not a personal or unofficial mirror. The main concern is that md5 is a weak hash and the obfuscated filename (add732140c983267.rar) makes it harder to verify, but this is a sloppy packaging practice rather than a genuine supply-chain attack. The Windows EXE is executed at runtime via Wine (not at build time), which is the expected pattern for *-wine-bin packages. Overall this is low risk: sloppy but not a security threat.

Triggered rules

LOW AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 72%): The source is downloaded directly from the official vendor domain (en.rd-acs.com), which is the same domain listed in the package's url= field. The RAR archive contains a Windows installer (RDWorksV8Setup8.01.18.exe) that is installed as a data file under /usr/share and then presumably run via Wine through the wrapper script. The wrapper script itself is checksummed. The md5sums are weak but present. The host is the official vendor site, not a personal or unofficial mirror. The main concern is that md5 is a weak hash and the obfuscated filename (add732140c983267.rar) makes it harder to verify, but this is a sloppy packaging practice rather than a genuine supply-chain attack. The Windows EXE is executed at runtime via Wine (not at build time), which is the expected pattern for *-wine-bin packages. Overall this is low risk: sloppy but not a security threat.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:21 source=("http://en.rd-acs.com/Private/Files/add732140c983267.rar"

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Aiyion <aur@aiyionpri.me>
2pkgname=rdworks-wine-bin
3pkgver=8.01.18
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc='A powerful program that allows you to perform laser cutting engraving operations'
6arch=('any')
7url='http://en.rd-acs.com/prod_view.aspx?TypeId=50105&Id=148'
8license=('GPL')
9groups=()
10depends=('wine'
11 'winetricks')
12makedepends=('unrar')
13optdepends=('wine-mono: or take dotnet')
14provides=()
15conflicts=()
16replaces=()
17backup=()
18options=()
19install=
20changelog=
21source=("http://en.rd-acs.com/Private/Files/add732140c983267.rar"
22 "rdworks-wine-bin")
23noextract=("add732140c983267.rar")
24md5sums=('3102d7217a72c9b95e4a93898aefc173'
25 '29101780536e645ec479e49ead7266aa')
26
27prepare() {
28 unrar x add732140c983267.rar
29}
30
31package() {
32 install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
33 install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/rdworks-wine-bin
34
35 install -Dm755 rdworks-wine-bin "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/rdworks-wine-bin
36 install -Dm755 RDWorksV8Setup8.01.18.exe "$pkgdir"/usr/share/rdworks-wine-bin/RDWorksV8Setup8.01.18.exe
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 LOW 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 LOW 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 LOW 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 LOW 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 LOW 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 LOW 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 LOW 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 LOW 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 LOW 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 LOW 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 LOW 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 LOW 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 LOW 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 LOW 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 LOW 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 LOW 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 LOW 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 LOW 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 LOW 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 LOW 2

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