recettescuisine

maintainer Dalan · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged A prebuilt JAR file is downloaded from binaries.dalan.fr, which is the maintainer's own personal binary hosting domain rather than an official upstream release host (e.g. GitHub releases, Maven Central, or a well-known project mirror). The JAR is executed at runtime by the Java runtime, so it constitutes executed code from an unofficial/personal host. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious JAR and updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD simultaneously. This is a classic AUR supply-chain pattern: maintainer controls both the binary host and the PKGBUILD, so a compromise of either yields code execution on the user's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — it is the standard medium-severity concern for self-hosted prebuilt binaries in the AUR.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=('https://www.binaries.dalan.fr/RecettesCuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar'

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): A prebuilt JAR file is downloaded from binaries.dalan.fr, which is the maintainer's own personal binary hosting domain rather than an official upstream release host (e.g. GitHub releases, Maven Central, or a well-known project mirror). The JAR is executed at runtime by the Java runtime, so it constitutes executed code from an unofficial/personal host. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious JAR and updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD simultaneously. This is a classic AUR supply-chain pattern: maintainer controls both the binary host and the PKGBUILD, so a compromise of either yields code execution on the user's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — it is the standard medium-severity concern for self-hosted prebuilt binaries in the AUR.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Rémi BERTHO <remi.bertho@dalan.fr>
    
      2# Contributor: Rémi BERTHO <remi.bertho@dalan.fr>
    
      3pkgname=recettescuisine
    
      4pkgver=1.3.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A recipe manager written in java"
    
      7arch=(any)
    
      8url="https://www.dalan.fr"
    
      9license=('GPL')
    
      10depends=('java-runtime')
    
      11install="INSTALL"
    
      12source=('https://www.binaries.dalan.fr/RecettesCuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar'
    
      13		'logo.png'
    
      14		'recettescuisine.desktop'
    
      15		'recettescuisine')
    
      16sha256sums=('b083b4ed1dfd361c32dc7b2b0747210936f42eb5700fcb6767909b3c5b5beed9'
    
      17			'b22cfa31a19a5027a236b2d968f39378967ee11e309d8405b3784699f64bde7a'
    
      18			'e553612b1a2086f79fec4253bfde61c66d6dcebe3bde74c38b43c895b7a7c5c1'
    
      19			'1a00beeaaaf5e0aece33f3428c9ea033c5e236a7362ad17016bebb887efe6f8e')
    
      20
    
      21package()
    
      22{
    
      23    mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
    
      24    mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/"
    
      25    mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
    
      26
    
      27    cp recettescuisine "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
    
      28    cp RecettesCuisine.jar "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar"
    
      29    cp logo.png "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/"
    
      30    cp recettescuisine.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
    
      31}
    
      32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2