recettescuisine

MEDIUM
maintainer Dalan 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

A prebuilt JAR file is downloaded from binaries.dalan.fr, which is the maintainer's own personal binary hosting domain rather than an official upstream release host (e.g. GitHub releases, Maven Central, or a well-known project mirror). The JAR is executed at runtime by the Java runtime, so it constitutes executed code from an unofficial/personal host. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious JAR and updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD simultaneously. This is a classic AUR supply-chain pattern: maintainer controls both the binary host and the PKGBUILD, so a compromise of either yields code execution on the user's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — it is the standard medium-severity concern for self-hosted prebuilt binaries in the AUR.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=('https://www.binaries.dalan.fr/RecettesCuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar'
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): A prebuilt JAR file is downloaded from binaries.dalan.fr, which is the maintainer's own personal binary hosting domain rather than an official upstream release host (e.g. GitHub releases, Maven Central, or a well-known project mirror). The JAR is executed at runtime by the Java runtime, so it constitutes executed code from an unofficial/personal host. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious JAR and updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD simultaneously. This is a classic AUR supply-chain pattern: maintainer controls both the binary host and the PKGBUILD, so a compromise of either yields code execution on the user's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — it is the standard medium-severity concern for self-hosted prebuilt binaries in the AUR.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Rémi BERTHO <remi.bertho@dalan.fr>
2# Contributor: Rémi BERTHO <remi.bertho@dalan.fr>
3pkgname=recettescuisine
4pkgver=1.3.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A recipe manager written in java"
7arch=(any)
8url="https://www.dalan.fr"
9license=('GPL')
10depends=('java-runtime')
11install="INSTALL"
12source=('https://www.binaries.dalan.fr/RecettesCuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar'
13 'logo.png'
14 'recettescuisine.desktop'
15 'recettescuisine')
16sha256sums=('b083b4ed1dfd361c32dc7b2b0747210936f42eb5700fcb6767909b3c5b5beed9'
17 'b22cfa31a19a5027a236b2d968f39378967ee11e309d8405b3784699f64bde7a'
18 'e553612b1a2086f79fec4253bfde61c66d6dcebe3bde74c38b43c895b7a7c5c1'
19 '1a00beeaaaf5e0aece33f3428c9ea033c5e236a7362ad17016bebb887efe6f8e')
20
21package()
22{
23 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
24 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/"
25 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
26
27 cp recettescuisine "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
28 cp RecettesCuisine.jar "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/RecettesCuisine.jar"
29 cp logo.png "$pkgdir/usr/share/recettescuisine/"
30 cp recettescuisine.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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