recollectr

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from recollectr.io (the official vendor site for this product), extracts and installs it. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums='SKIP' for the AppImage means there is no integrity verification — any compromise of recollectr.io or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine; (2) pkgver='latest' combined with a URL that always fetches the latest version means the package is not pinned to any specific release, making reproducibility impossible and silently pulling in whatever the server currently serves; (3) the AppImage is executed during the build phase (./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract) to extract its contents, meaning a malicious or tampered binary runs at build time. While recollectr.io appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site (not a personal/unofficial host), the combination of SKIP checksums, unpinned 'latest' version, and execution of a downloaded binary during packaging represents a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://recollectr.io/download/linux/"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from recollectr.io (the official vendor site for this product), extracts and installs it. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums='SKIP' for the AppImage means there is no integrity verification — any compromise of recollectr.io or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine; (2) pkgver='latest' combined with a URL that always fetches the latest version means the package is not pinned to any specific release, making reproducibility impossible and silently pulling in whatever the server currently serves; (3) the AppImage is executed during the build phase (./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract) to extract its contents, meaning a malicious or tampered binary runs at build time. While recollectr.io appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site (not a personal/unofficial host), the combination of SKIP checksums, unpinned 'latest' version, and execution of a downloaded binary during packaging represents a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
2
3pkgname=recollectr
4pkgver=latest
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Record and recall without breaking your flow"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url='https://recollectr.io'
9license=("custom:${pkgname}")
10makedepends=('gendesk')
11noextract=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
12source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://recollectr.io/download/linux/"
13 'LICENSE')
14sha256sums=('SKIP'
15 'SKIP')
16
17package() {
18 install -Dm644 LICENSE -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
19 chmod 755 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage
20 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract
21 install -Dm644 squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/recollectr.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/recollectr.png"
22 gendesk -f -n --pkgname "${pkgname}" \
23 --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
24 --name "Recollectr" \
25 --comment "$pkgdesc" \
26 --exec "${pkgname}" \
27 --categories 'Utility;Office;Application' \
28 --icon "${pkgname}"
29 install -Dm644 "${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
30 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
31 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
32 cp -avR squashfs-root/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
33 ln -s /opt/${pkgname}/AppRun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/recollectr"
34 find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
35}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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