reemod-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.reemo.io (the vendor's own download subdomain) and installs its contents directly. This is a legitimate pattern for binary AUR packages, but the host is a relatively obscure vendor domain rather than a major distribution mirror. The real concern is: (1) a prebuilt binary is extracted and installed without any signature verification beyond weak MD5 checksums, (2) the systemd service file is also pulled from the same host at a non-versioned URL (no version in the path for reemod.service), meaning it could silently change between builds, and (3) MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides minimal integrity assurance. However, download.reemo.io appears to be the official vendor distribution endpoint for Reemo (reemo.io), making this analogous to other -bin AUR packages that pull from vendor CDNs. The risk is real but typical for this class of package — supply-chain exposure if the vendor host is compromised — not an active attack. Medium is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://download.reemo.io/linux/deb/$pkgver/jammy/reemo.deb"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.reemo.io (the vendor's own download subdomain) and installs its contents directly. This is a legitimate pattern for binary AUR packages, but the host is a relatively obscure vendor domain rather than a major distribution mirror. The real concern is: (1) a prebuilt binary is extracted and installed without any signature verification beyond weak MD5 checksums, (2) the systemd service file is also pulled from the same host at a non-versioned URL (no version in the path for reemod.service), meaning it could silently change between builds, and (3) MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides minimal integrity assurance. However, download.reemo.io appears to be the official vendor distribution endpoint for Reemo (reemo.io), making this analogous to other -bin AUR packages that pull from vendor CDNs. The risk is real but typical for this class of package — supply-chain exposure if the vendor host is compromised — not an active attack. Medium is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: JianQing Liu <me at pegasis dot site>
2pkgname=reemod-bin
3pkgver=1.8.2
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="Low latency desktop streaming for everyone"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://reemo.io/"
8license=('unknown')
9provides=('reemod')
10depends=('ffmpeg' 'glib2' 'libpulse' 'libx11' 'libxcb' 'libxtst')
11makedepends=()
12source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://download.reemo.io/linux/deb/$pkgver/jammy/reemo.deb"
13'reemod.service::https://download.reemo.io/linux/deb/reemod.service'
14'reemo.ini')
15md5sums=('bf18fe8676f6fae783e4e0e9c579748f'
16'bc60c405a23e954f5f41a02fbf217022'
17'e016da41d1e4fe4b3ab9687cf9e4e108')
18install='INSTALL'
19
20
21package() {
22 bsdtar -xf data.tar.gz -C "$pkgdir/"
23 install -Dm644 reemod.service "$pkgdir/etc/systemd/system/reemod.service"
24 install -Dm644 reemo.ini "$pkgdir/opt/reemo/reemo.ini"
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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