reliquary-cli

maintainer rvid · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt tarball from reliquary.se (a personal/project host, not a major forge or distro mirror) and installs all extracted binaries into /usr/bin with execute permissions. Two compounding issues: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means there is zero integrity verification — any content served at that URL is blindly trusted and executed; (2) the glob `reliquary-*` installs whatever binaries are in the tarball without any explicit enumeration, so a compromised or swapped tarball could silently add extra executables. The depends on 'sanctum' (a niche crypto tool) and the project's own domain suggest this is a legitimate but small personal project, not an active attack, but the combination of an unverified binary tarball from a non-standard host with SKIP checksums is a genuine supply-chain risk meeting the medium threshold.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=('https://reliquary.se/reliquary-cli.tar')

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt tarball from reliquary.se (a personal/project host, not a major forge or distro mirror) and installs all extracted binaries into /usr/bin with execute permissions. Two compounding issues: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means there is zero integrity verification — any content served at that URL is blindly trusted and executed; (2) the glob `reliquary-*` installs whatever binaries are in the tarball without any explicit enumeration, so a compromised or swapped tarball could silently add extra executables. The depends on 'sanctum' (a niche crypto tool) and the project's own domain suggest this is a legitimate but small personal project, not an active attack, but the combination of an unverified binary tarball from a non-standard host with SKIP checksums is a genuine supply-chain risk meeting the medium threshold.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: rvid <contact@rvid.eu>
    
      2pkgname=reliquary-cli
    
      3pkgver=2
    
      4pkgrel=2
    
      5pkgdesc="CLI tool for communicating with the sanctum-based API, to help you manage your devices and shared secrets."
    
      6arch=('any')
    
      7depends=('jq' 'curl' 'sanctum' 'xxd')
    
      8optdepends=('confessions: peer to peer voice program to make reliquary voice calls' 'litany: peer-to-peer chat program')
    
      9url='https://reliquary.se'
    
      10source=('https://reliquary.se/reliquary-cli.tar')
    
      11sha256sums=('SKIP')
    
      12
    
      13package() {
    
      14  cd "$srcdir"
    
      15  for bin in reliquary-*; do
    
      16    if [[ $bin != "reliquary-cli.tar" ]]; then
    
      17      install -Dm755 $bin "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$bin"
    
      18    fi
    
      19  done
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2