replit-desktop-app
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from desktop.replit.com (the official Replit desktop download endpoint) and extracts it directly into the package tree. While the domain is Replit's own, the source URL is a redirect/alias ('download/deb') rather than a versioned artifact URL, meaning the sha256sum check is the only integrity guard — if the upstream host serves a different binary for the same URL in the future, the checksum would catch it only if the maintainer updates the PKGBUILD. More importantly, the package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary blob from an external host rather than building from source, which is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary is executed at runtime and its contents are not auditable from the PKGBUILD alone. The electron dependency is used as a system runtime but the app's own asar and native modules come from the deb. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk (prebuilt executed binary from an external host), not a false positive, though it is not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:16
replit.deb::https://desktop.replit.com/download/deb
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from desktop.replit.com (the official Replit desktop download endpoint) and extracts it directly into the package tree. While the domain is Replit's own, the source URL is a redirect/alias ('download/deb') rather than a versioned artifact URL, meaning the sha256sum check is the only integrity guard — if the upstream host serves a different binary for the same URL in the future, the checksum would catch it only if the maintainer updates the PKGBUILD. More importantly, the package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary blob from an external host rather than building from source, which is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary is executed at runtime and its contents are not auditable from the PKGBUILD alone. The electron dependency is used as a system runtime but the app's own asar and native modules come from the deb. This is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk (prebuilt executed binary from an external host), not a false positive, though it is not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Kid <hi at xuann dot wang>
pkgname=replit-desktop-app
pkgver=1.0.14
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='The collaborative browser based IDE'
arch=(x86_64)
url=https://replit.com/desktop
license=(custom)
depends=(
electron
)
install=.install
source=(
replit.deb::https://desktop.replit.com/download/deb
replit
)
sha256sums=('04e2233d75a3f494bc0a3e15ec21119186c15c9f4df5bd5e5942a13d99165170'
'9392ee9aced0cda3a50e00bc1fe40f75830388143254cbcb42929802b835d277')
package() {
local usr="$pkgdir/usr"
local lib="$usr/lib/replit"
tar xf data.tar.zst -C "$pkgdir"
find "$lib" -type f ! -name '*.asar' -exec rm {} \;
rm -d "$lib/locales"
rm -r "$usr/share/lintian"
install -D replit -t "$usr/bin"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |