reqable-appimage
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from pkgs.reqable.com inside prepare() using wget rather than declaring it in source=() with a checksum. This means: (1) makepkg cannot verify integrity — there is no sha256sum or b2sum check on the downloaded binary, so a compromised or swapped binary would go undetected; (2) the download happens at build time outside of makepkg's normal source-fetching and verification pipeline. The host (pkgs.reqable.com) appears to be the official Reqable distribution server, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the real concern is the complete absence of any integrity check on an executed binary. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could silently deliver a malicious AppImage. Additionally, the package() function references srcdir/squashfs-root which is never created (the AppImage is never extracted with --appimage-extract), making the package likely broken as well, but the security concern stands regardless.
Triggered rules
external_download_not_in_source
curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.
-
PKGBUILD:19
wget "https://pkgs.reqable.com/download/reqable-app-linux-x86_64.AppImage?platform=linux&arch=x86_64&version=${pkgver}&ext=AppImage" -O ${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from pkgs.reqable.com inside prepare() using wget rather than declaring it in source=() with a checksum. This means: (1) makepkg cannot verify integrity — there is no sha256sum or b2sum check on the downloaded binary, so a compromised or swapped binary would go undetected; (2) the download happens at build time outside of makepkg's normal source-fetching and verification pipeline. The host (pkgs.reqable.com) appears to be the official Reqable distribution server, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the real concern is the complete absence of any integrity check on an executed binary. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could silently deliver a malicious AppImage. Additionally, the package() function references srcdir/squashfs-root which is never created (the AppImage is never extracted with --appimage-extract), making the package likely broken as well, but the security concern stands regardless.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Aryan Ghasemi <t.me/gnuphile>
# Contributor: Wang Litao
pkgname="reqable-appimage"
pkgver=3.0.40
_pkgname='reqable'
_archive="$_pkgname-$pkgver"
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Reqable is a new generation API debugging and testing solution (HTTP1/2/3)."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://reqable.com"
license=('custom')
depends=('zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'fuse2')
options=(!strip !debug)
conflicts=(${_pkgname})
provides=(${_pkgname})
prepare() {
wget "https://pkgs.reqable.com/download/reqable-app-linux-x86_64.AppImage?platform=linux&arch=x86_64&version=${pkgver}&ext=AppImage" -O ${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage
chmod +x "${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}.AppImage"
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
ln -s "/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${_pkgname}"
cd "${srcdir}/squashfs-root"
install -Dm644 "${_pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
sed -i "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=${_pkgname}|g" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgname}.desktop"
sed -i "s|Icon=reqable|Icon=${_pkgname}|g" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgname}.desktop"
install -Dm644 "${_pkgname}.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/${_pkgname}.png"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |