reqable-appimage

maintainer labulakalia · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from pkgs.reqable.com inside prepare() using wget rather than declaring it in source=() with a checksum. This means: (1) makepkg cannot verify integrity — there is no sha256sum or b2sum check on the downloaded binary, so a compromised or swapped binary would go undetected; (2) the download happens at build time outside of makepkg's normal source-fetching and verification pipeline. The host (pkgs.reqable.com) appears to be the official Reqable distribution server, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the real concern is the complete absence of any integrity check on an executed binary. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could silently deliver a malicious AppImage. Additionally, the package() function references srcdir/squashfs-root which is never created (the AppImage is never extracted with --appimage-extract), making the package likely broken as well, but the security concern stands regardless.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:19 wget "https://pkgs.reqable.com/download/reqable-app-linux-x86_64.AppImage?platform=linux&arch=x86_64&version=${pkgver}&ext=AppImage" -O ${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from pkgs.reqable.com inside prepare() using wget rather than declaring it in source=() with a checksum. This means: (1) makepkg cannot verify integrity — there is no sha256sum or b2sum check on the downloaded binary, so a compromised or swapped binary would go undetected; (2) the download happens at build time outside of makepkg's normal source-fetching and verification pipeline. The host (pkgs.reqable.com) appears to be the official Reqable distribution server, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the real concern is the complete absence of any integrity check on an executed binary. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a MITM or server compromise could silently deliver a malicious AppImage. Additionally, the package() function references srcdir/squashfs-root which is never created (the AppImage is never extracted with --appimage-extract), making the package likely broken as well, but the security concern stands regardless.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Aryan Ghasemi <t.me/gnuphile>
2# Contributor: Wang Litao
3
4pkgname="reqable-appimage"
5pkgver=3.0.40
6_pkgname='reqable'
7_archive="$_pkgname-$pkgver"
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc="Reqable is a new generation API debugging and testing solution (HTTP1/2/3)."
10arch=('x86_64')
11url="https://reqable.com"
12license=('custom')
13depends=('zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'fuse2')
14options=(!strip !debug)
15conflicts=(${_pkgname})
16provides=(${_pkgname})
17
18prepare() {
19 wget "https://pkgs.reqable.com/download/reqable-app-linux-x86_64.AppImage?platform=linux&arch=x86_64&version=${pkgver}&ext=AppImage" -O ${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage
20 chmod +x "${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage"
21}
22
23package() {
24 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_archive}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}.AppImage"
25
26 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
27 ln -s "/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${_pkgname}"
28
29 cd "${srcdir}/squashfs-root"
30
31 install -Dm644 "${_pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
32 sed -i "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=${_pkgname}|g" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgname}.desktop"
33 sed -i "s|Icon=reqable|Icon=${_pkgname}|g" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgname}.desktop"
34
35 install -Dm644 "${_pkgname}.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/${_pkgname}.png"
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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