reqview

MEDIUM
maintainer Ganji 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an S3 bucket (s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/reqview-desktop-linux/) which is the vendor's own distribution channel for ReqView, a commercial requirements management tool. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at the specific version. However, the source is a prebuilt Electron/native binary from an S3 bucket rather than an official distro repository or a GitHub release with verifiable provenance — the bucket owner could replace the file at any time for future pkgver bumps, and there is no GPG signature verification. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed native binary from a non-standard (though plausibly vendor-controlled) host, with integrity only guaranteed by a hardcoded checksum that must be manually updated per release. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/reqview-desktop-linux/ReqView-${pkgver}-linux-amd64.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an S3 bucket (s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/reqview-desktop-linux/) which is the vendor's own distribution channel for ReqView, a commercial requirements management tool. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at the specific version. However, the source is a prebuilt Electron/native binary from an S3 bucket rather than an official distro repository or a GitHub release with verifiable provenance — the bucket owner could replace the file at any time for future pkgver bumps, and there is no GPG signature verification. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed native binary from a non-standard (though plausibly vendor-controlled) host, with integrity only guaranteed by a hardcoded checksum that must be manually updated per release. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Mateusz Kiersnowski
2
3pkgname=reqview
4pkgver=2.22.2
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A simple yet powerful requirements management tool in which you can easily capture structured requirements for a software or system product and track traceability to design, tests and risks of the developed product"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url='https://www.reqview.com'
9license=("custom:${pkgname}")
10depends=('gtk3'
11 'libxss'
12 'nss')
13makedepends=('tar')
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/reqview-desktop-linux/ReqView-${pkgver}-linux-amd64.deb"
15 'LICENSE')
16sha256sums=('9fb7da731db51ad3549c4fbeafd9e0d96e354b54a9b9e514c2a18818e42a986c'
17 '169f93960253462efd8efd846f05a8d4755667023f4350f6ca09a8d008938b3e')
18
19package() {
20 tar xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
21 install -Dm644 LICENSE -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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