rescribe-bin

maintainer rescribe · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary zip from cli.rescribe.dev (a personal/project subdomain, not a major distribution channel), extracts and installs a native binary (rescribe) and a native Node.js addon (nodegit.node), and also executes a postinstall.sh script from within the zip at build time. There is no PGP signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is weak and trivially collided). The combination of: (1) a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host, (2) a native .node addon (which is a shared library executed in-process), and (3) execution of an arbitrary shell script (postinstall.sh) extracted from the same untrusted zip, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. If the host or the zip is compromised, arbitrary code runs during package installation. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 source=("https://cli.rescribe.dev/linux.zip")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary zip from cli.rescribe.dev (a personal/project subdomain, not a major distribution channel), extracts and installs a native binary (rescribe) and a native Node.js addon (nodegit.node), and also executes a postinstall.sh script from within the zip at build time. There is no PGP signature verification, only an MD5 checksum (which is weak and trivially collided). The combination of: (1) a prebuilt binary from an unofficial host, (2) a native .node addon (which is a shared library executed in-process), and (3) execution of an arbitrary shell script (postinstall.sh) extracted from the same untrusted zip, constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. If the host or the zip is compromised, arbitrary code runs during package installation. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# This is the reScribe AUR PKGBUILD file.
2# For more information, see 'man PKGBUILD'.
3# Maintainer: reScribe <rescribe.dev@gmail.com>
4
5pkgname=rescribe-bin
6# update version in package.json, not here
7pkgver=0.0.27
8pkgrel=1
9epoch=
10pkgdesc="reScribe code search engine. CLI for interacting with reScribe api."
11arch=("x86_64")
12url="https://rescribe.dev"
13license=("CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0")
14groups=()
15depends=()
16makedepends=()
17checkdepends=()
18optdepends=()
19provides=()
20conflicts=()
21replaces=()
22backup=()
23options=("!strip")
24install=$pkgname.install
25changelog=
26source=("https://cli.rescribe.dev/linux.zip")
27noextract=()
28md5sums=("149103a115a22ebbfb21c110df220787")
29validpgpkeys=()
30
31package() {
32 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
33 chmod +x rescribe
34 mv rescribe "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
35 mv nodegit.node "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
36 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/home/$USER"
37
38 ./postinstall.sh $pkgdir
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion