rishiqing-uos

MEDIUM
maintainer Integral 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package repository. This is not the official rishiqing.com release channel, but rather a third-party Linux distribution's app store mirror. The package contains an Electron-based binary that gets extracted and executed directly. While uniontech.com is a legitimate Chinese Linux vendor (makers of Deepin/UOS), this is still a prebuilt binary from a distribution app store rather than the upstream vendor's own release infrastructure, creating a supply-chain dependency on that store's integrity. The sha512sum provides some integrity protection against transit tampering, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious package. The binary is executed directly from /opt without any build-from-source step. This fits the medium classification: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official/non-upstream host) but not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.rishiqing.uos/com.rishiqing.uos_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package repository. This is not the official rishiqing.com release channel, but rather a third-party Linux distribution's app store mirror. The package contains an Electron-based binary that gets extracted and executed directly. While uniontech.com is a legitimate Chinese Linux vendor (makers of Deepin/UOS), this is still a prebuilt binary from a distribution app store rather than the upstream vendor's own release infrastructure, creating a supply-chain dependency on that store's integrity. The sha512sum provides some integrity protection against transit tampering, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious package. The binary is executed directly from /opt without any build-from-source step. This fits the medium classification: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official/non-upstream host) but not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Integral <integral@member.fsf.org>
2# Maintainer: ston <2424284164@qq.com>
3
4pkgname=rishiqing-uos
5pkgver=3.3.1
6pkgrel=3
7pkgdesc="日事清 A teamwork management software."
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://www.rishiqing.com/"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxss' 'alsa-lib')
12source=(
13 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.rishiqing.uos/com.rishiqing.uos_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
14)
15sha512sums=('0c5897b6e1f0d3de8ec6f054a3bfce1df866afa3405bd6bac9a827431f13f2146a02eff44d35c83ac1d7f12c5a90810b518b9a9860607cc8317615a04c9358f3')
16
17package() {
18 echo " -> Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
19 bsdtar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
20 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/opt/"
21 echo " -> Installing..."
22
23 # Launcher
24 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
25 ln -s /opt/apps/com.rishiqing.uos/files/rishiqing ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
26 # Desktop Entry
27 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.rishiqing.uos/entries/applications/com.rishiqing.uos.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
28 # Icons
29 cp -r "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.rishiqing.uos/entries/icons/" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
30 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
31 # License
32 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.rishiqing.uos/files/LICENSE.electron.txt" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
33 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.rishiqing.uos/files/LICENSES.chromium.html" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
34}
35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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