rock.so

maintainer pacmanUser · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads and installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from desktop.rock.so, which is the vendor's own subdomain for distributing the Rock desktop client. This is a legitimate product (rock.so is a real productivity/messaging app), and the source host appears to be the official distribution endpoint. However, the binary is a closed-source, prebuilt executable from a non-GitHub/non-standard host with no way to verify it against an independent source. The sha512sums are present and pin the specific binary, which mitigates opportunistic substitution but not a targeted swap at the source. The PKGBUILD also executes the AppImage during build (--appimage-extract) to extract an icon, which means the AppImage runs at package build time. This is a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would execute code on the builder's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — this is a standard pattern for AppImage-based AUR packages, but the non-standard host and closed-source binary warrant a medium rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 https://desktop.rock.so/Rock-${pkgver}.AppImage
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads and installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from desktop.rock.so, which is the vendor's own subdomain for distributing the Rock desktop client. This is a legitimate product (rock.so is a real productivity/messaging app), and the source host appears to be the official distribution endpoint. However, the binary is a closed-source, prebuilt executable from a non-GitHub/non-standard host with no way to verify it against an independent source. The sha512sums are present and pin the specific binary, which mitigates opportunistic substitution but not a targeted swap at the source. The PKGBUILD also executes the AppImage during build (--appimage-extract) to extract an icon, which means the AppImage runs at package build time. This is a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would execute code on the builder's machine. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice — this is a standard pattern for AppImage-based AUR packages, but the non-standard host and closed-source binary warrant a medium rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Aditya Mishra <pegvinaditya@proton.me>
2pkgname=rock.so
3pkgver=1.2.1
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="All In One Messaging - Manage Tasks, Files & Notes"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://rock.so/"
8license=('Unlicensed') # Extract The AppImage & Check the package.json file in resources/app/
9provides=('rock.so')
10conflicts=('rock.so')
11depends=('fuse2')
12options=(!strip) # necessary otherwise the AppImage file in the package is truncated
13source=(
14 https://desktop.rock.so/Rock-${pkgver}.AppImage
15 rock_custom.desktop
16)
17sha512sums=(
18 3f2d7893d8659174956fcd3d06960e6256e0ef394a800c32db0f71c84a778d12ed2b6da263e65a2b53374d5347415e42d094924958048ca6427248b4ffd142a3
19 bae726112288220973d56e16edf738eaaf6dc212da0b3008dae4dd8d2919bd2bab63f80bbd451fd8ffa31c48af8977d307a4f266f95780f5402bd9d718d9b1a5
20)
21
22_filename="Rock-${pkgver}.AppImage"
23
24package() {
25 chmod +x ${_filename}
26 ./${_filename} --appimage-extract
27
28 install -Dm644 "./squashfs-root/rock.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/rock_so.png"
29 install -Dm644 "./rock_custom.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/rock_so.desktop"
30 install -Dm755 ${_filename} "$pkgdir/usr/bin/rock_so"
31
32 rm -rf ./squashfs-root
33}
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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