rootchat-bin

maintainer cloudwithax · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from installer.rootapp.com, which appears to be the official vendor's CDN/installer host for rootapp.com. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it, and the resulting binaries are installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk, but the URL points to a mutable path (Root.AppImage without version in the path), meaning the checksum could become stale or the file could be silently replaced at the source. This is a standard pattern for binary AppImage packages in the AUR, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum is the only integrity guarantee. The host (installer.rootapp.com) is plausibly the official vendor infrastructure. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host with a fixed checksum but a mutable URL — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the host or the file is ever substituted.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://installer.rootapp.com/installer/Linux/X64/Root.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from installer.rootapp.com, which appears to be the official vendor's CDN/installer host for rootapp.com. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it, and the resulting binaries are installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk, but the URL points to a mutable path (Root.AppImage without version in the path), meaning the checksum could become stale or the file could be silently replaced at the source. This is a standard pattern for binary AppImage packages in the AUR, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum is the only integrity guarantee. The host (installer.rootapp.com) is plausibly the official vendor infrastructure. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host with a fixed checksum but a mutable URL — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the host or the file is ever substituted.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: cloudwithax <heyimnick14@gmail.com>
2pkgname=rootchat-bin
3pkgver=0.9.84
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="A community platform combining chat with task management, raid planning, and customizable apps"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://rootapp.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('zlib' 'gcc-libs' 'glibc' 'fuse2')
10provides=('rootchat')
11conflicts=('rootchat')
12options=('!strip' '!debug')
13source=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://installer.rootapp.com/installer/Linux/X64/Root.AppImage")
14sha256sums=('06a5564ccaaf38eab76f6a3a0e49cca2db822028a1d1a7be2dafd9a8f47bf4f9')
15noextract=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage")
16
17prepare() {
18 chmod +x "${srcdir}/Root-${pkgver}.AppImage"
19 "${srcdir}/Root-${pkgver}.AppImage" --appimage-extract
20}
21
22package() {
23 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
24 cp -r "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/bin/"* "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
25
26 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
27 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/Root" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/rootchat"
28
29 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/Root.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/rootchat.png"
30
31 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/rootchat.desktop" <<EOF
32[Desktop Entry]
33Type=Application
34Name=Root
35Comment=Community platform combining chat with task management and customizable apps
36Exec=rootchat
37Icon=rootchat
38Terminal=false
39StartupWMClass=Root
40Categories=Network;InstantMessaging;
41EOF
42}
43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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