rootchat-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer cloudwithax 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from installer.rootapp.com, which appears to be the official vendor's CDN/installer host for rootapp.com. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it, and the resulting binaries are installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk, but the URL points to a mutable path (Root.AppImage without version in the path), meaning the checksum could become stale or the file could be silently replaced at the source. This is a standard pattern for binary AppImage packages in the AUR, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum is the only integrity guarantee. The host (installer.rootapp.com) is plausibly the official vendor infrastructure. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host with a fixed checksum but a mutable URL — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the host or the file is ever substituted.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://installer.rootapp.com/installer/Linux/X64/Root.AppImage")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from installer.rootapp.com, which appears to be the official vendor's CDN/installer host for rootapp.com. The AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it, and the resulting binaries are installed. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk, but the URL points to a mutable path (Root.AppImage without version in the path), meaning the checksum could become stale or the file could be silently replaced at the source. This is a standard pattern for binary AppImage packages in the AUR, but the non-versioned URL means the checksum is the only integrity guarantee. The host (installer.rootapp.com) is plausibly the official vendor infrastructure. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host with a fixed checksum but a mutable URL — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the host or the file is ever substituted.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: cloudwithax <heyimnick14@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=rootchat-bin
    
      3pkgver=0.9.84
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="A community platform combining chat with task management, raid planning, and customizable apps"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://rootapp.com"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9depends=('zlib' 'gcc-libs' 'glibc' 'fuse2')
    
      10provides=('rootchat')
    
      11conflicts=('rootchat')
    
      12options=('!strip' '!debug')
    
      13source=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://installer.rootapp.com/installer/Linux/X64/Root.AppImage")
    
      14sha256sums=('06a5564ccaaf38eab76f6a3a0e49cca2db822028a1d1a7be2dafd9a8f47bf4f9')
    
      15noextract=("Root-${pkgver}.AppImage")
    
      16
    
      17prepare() {
    
      18    chmod +x "${srcdir}/Root-${pkgver}.AppImage"
    
      19    "${srcdir}/Root-${pkgver}.AppImage" --appimage-extract
    
      20}
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      24    cp -r "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/bin/"* "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
    
      25
    
      26    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      27    ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/Root" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/rootchat"
    
      28
    
      29    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/Root.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/rootchat.png"
    
      30
    
      31    install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/rootchat.desktop" <<EOF
    
      32[Desktop Entry]
    
      33Type=Application
    
      34Name=Root
    
      35Comment=Community platform combining chat with task management and customizable apps
    
      36Exec=rootchat
    
      37Icon=rootchat
    
      38Terminal=false
    
      39StartupWMClass=Root
    
      40Categories=Network;InstantMessaging;
    
      41EOF
    
      42}
    
      43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2