rudesktop

MEDIUM
maintainer geomaster 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (rudesktop-2.9.1069-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst) from storage.rudesktop.ru, which is the vendor's own storage host rather than a well-known, independently auditable source. The package installs an executable binary (usr/bin/rudesktop), a shared library (libsciter-gtk.so), and a systemd service — all of which execute with system privileges. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a malicious or compromised vendor host serving a backdoored binary. The maintainer email matches the vendor domain (rudesktop.ru), suggesting this is the upstream vendor packaging their own proprietary software, which is a common AUR pattern, but the binary is still opaque and unauditable. The combination of a prebuilt binary + shared library + systemd service from a single non-mainstream vendor host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk: if storage.rudesktop.ru is compromised or the vendor is malicious, arbitrary code runs on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("https://storage.rudesktop.ru/download/rudesktop-2.9.1069-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (rudesktop-2.9.1069-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst) from storage.rudesktop.ru, which is the vendor's own storage host rather than a well-known, independently auditable source. The package installs an executable binary (usr/bin/rudesktop), a shared library (libsciter-gtk.so), and a systemd service — all of which execute with system privileges. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against a malicious or compromised vendor host serving a backdoored binary. The maintainer email matches the vendor domain (rudesktop.ru), suggesting this is the upstream vendor packaging their own proprietary software, which is a common AUR pattern, but the binary is still opaque and unauditable. The combination of a prebuilt binary + shared library + systemd service from a single non-mainstream vendor host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk: if storage.rudesktop.ru is compromised or the vendor is malicious, arbitrary code runs on the user's system. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: RuDesktop <info@rudesktop.ru>
2# Contributor: George Kiselyov <i[dot]am[at]kiselyov-george[dot]ru>
3
4pkgname=rudesktop
5pkgver=2.9.1069
6pkgrel=5
7arch=('x86_64')
8pkgdesc="Ru-Desktop client for home use"
9url="https://rudesktop.ru/downloads/"
10license=('Commercial')
11install=${pkgname}.install
12depends=(sudo ca-certificates python lshw smartmontools pyalpm cron gtk3 libxcb alsa-lib libxfixes libsystemd python-evdev python-six python-pynput python-xlib libpulse)
13sha256sums=('413dc48ae38076ce40ae1ac4f6f62e13e0f173bb656587041a093c10d17e8020')
14options=(!debug)
15source=("https://storage.rudesktop.ru/download/rudesktop-2.9.1069-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst")
16
17package() {
18 cd "${srcdir}"
19 install -Dm 755 -d "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/rudesktop-client
20 cp -r usr/share/rudesktop-client "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/
21 cp -r usr/share/applications "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/
22 cp -r usr/share/icons "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/
23 install -Dm755 usr/bin/rudesktop "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/rudesktop"
24 install -Dm664 usr/lib/libsciter-gtk.so "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libsciter-gtk.so"
25 install -Dm644 usr/share/${pkgname}-client/files/systemd/${pkgname}.service "${pkgdir}"/usr/lib/systemd/system/${pkgname}.service
26 install -Dm644 usr/share/${pkgname}-client/files/systemd/${pkgname}-user.service "${pkgdir}"/usr/lib/systemd/user/${pkgname}.service
27}
28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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