scholaread-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer summerelement 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn.scholaread.com (the vendor's own CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — any compromise of the CDN or a MITM attack would silently deliver malicious binaries; (2) the package installs a setuid-root binary (chrome-sandbox with chmod 4755), which is a high-privilege operation; (3) it's a closed-source Electron app binary with no source verification. However, cdn.scholaread.com appears to be the official vendor CDN for the scholaread.com product, making this more of a standard 'binary from vendor' AUR pattern rather than a clearly unofficial/personal host. The SKIP checksum is the real concern — it means every install fetches whatever is currently at that URL with no pinning. This is a genuine supply-chain risk (medium) but not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn.scholaread.com/assets/pc-releases/${pkgver}/com/Scholaread-linux-amd64-${pkgver}.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn.scholaread.com (the vendor's own CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — any compromise of the CDN or a MITM attack would silently deliver malicious binaries; (2) the package installs a setuid-root binary (chrome-sandbox with chmod 4755), which is a high-privilege operation; (3) it's a closed-source Electron app binary with no source verification. However, cdn.scholaread.com appears to be the official vendor CDN for the scholaread.com product, making this more of a standard 'binary from vendor' AUR pattern rather than a clearly unofficial/personal host. The SKIP checksum is the real concern — it means every install fetches whatever is currently at that URL with no pinning. This is a genuine supply-chain risk (medium) but not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: SummerElement <Dapugongying@foxmail.com>
2pkgname=scholaread-bin
3pkgver=1.1.66
4pkgrel=3
5pkgdesc="A helpful AI driven software that helps you do research."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://scholaread.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxss' 'libxtst')
10optdepends=('libnotify: desktop notifications support'
11 'xdg-utils: open URLs in browser'
12 'libsecret: password storage support'
13 'at-spi2-core: accessibility support'
14 'util-linux-libs: UUID generation support'
15 'libappindicator: system tray icon support')
16source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn.scholaread.com/assets/pc-releases/${pkgver}/com/Scholaread-linux-amd64-${pkgver}.deb")
17sha256sums=('SKIP')
18
19package() {
20 # unzip DEB
21 ar x "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
22 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
23
24 # fix file permission
25 chmod +x "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/scholaread"
26 chmod 4755 "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/chrome-sandbox"
27
28 # setup license
29 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/LICENSE.electron.txt" \
30 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
31}
32
33post_install() {
34 # update icon cache
35 update-desktop-database
36 gtk-update-icon-cache -qt /usr/share/icons/hicolor
37}
38
39post_upgrade() {
40 post_install
41}
42
43post_remove() {
44 post_install
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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