scholaread-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer summerelement 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn.scholaread.com (the vendor's own CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — any compromise of the CDN or a MITM attack would silently deliver malicious binaries; (2) the package installs a setuid-root binary (chrome-sandbox with chmod 4755), which is a high-privilege operation; (3) it's a closed-source Electron app binary with no source verification. However, cdn.scholaread.com appears to be the official vendor CDN for the scholaread.com product, making this more of a standard 'binary from vendor' AUR pattern rather than a clearly unofficial/personal host. The SKIP checksum is the real concern — it means every install fetches whatever is currently at that URL with no pinning. This is a genuine supply-chain risk (medium) but not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn.scholaread.com/assets/pc-releases/${pkgver}/com/Scholaread-linux-amd64-${pkgver}.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 80%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn.scholaread.com (the vendor's own CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — any compromise of the CDN or a MITM attack would silently deliver malicious binaries; (2) the package installs a setuid-root binary (chrome-sandbox with chmod 4755), which is a high-privilege operation; (3) it's a closed-source Electron app binary with no source verification. However, cdn.scholaread.com appears to be the official vendor CDN for the scholaread.com product, making this more of a standard 'binary from vendor' AUR pattern rather than a clearly unofficial/personal host. The SKIP checksum is the real concern — it means every install fetches whatever is currently at that URL with no pinning. This is a genuine supply-chain risk (medium) but not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: SummerElement <Dapugongying@foxmail.com>
2pkgname=scholaread-bin
3pkgver=1.1.66
4pkgrel=3
5pkgdesc="A helpful AI driven software that helps you do research."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://scholaread.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxss' 'libxtst')
10optdepends=('libnotify: desktop notifications support'
11 'xdg-utils: open URLs in browser'
12 'libsecret: password storage support'
13 'at-spi2-core: accessibility support'
14 'util-linux-libs: UUID generation support'
15 'libappindicator: system tray icon support')
16source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn.scholaread.com/assets/pc-releases/${pkgver}/com/Scholaread-linux-amd64-${pkgver}.deb")
17sha256sums=('SKIP')
18
19package() {
20 # unzip DEB
21 ar x "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
22 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
23
24 # fix file permission
25 chmod +x "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/scholaread"
26 chmod 4755 "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/chrome-sandbox"
27
28 # setup license
29 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/Scholaread/LICENSE.electron.txt" \
30 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
31}
32
33post_install() {
34 # update icon cache
35 update-desktop-database
36 gtk-update-icon-cache -qt /usr/share/icons/hicolor
37}
38
39post_upgrade() {
40 post_install
41}
42
43post_remove() {
44 post_install
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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