seadrive-cli

MEDIUM
maintainer sclu1034 2 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io, which is Exoscale's object storage (a Swiss cloud provider). Seafile does legitimately use Exoscale/Exo object storage for their downloads — this is a known pattern for Seafile's distribution infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, it is not the canonical seafile.com domain, and the AppImage is executed directly (installed as a runnable binary with a symlink in /usr/bin). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and unverifiable beyond the hash. The concern is real but mild: if Exoscale storage were compromised or the upstream maintainer's bucket were taken over, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-primary domain, warranting medium severity, though it is likely a legitimate Seafile distribution channel rather than an attack.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io, which is Exoscale's object storage (a Swiss cloud provider). Seafile does legitimately use Exoscale/Exo object storage for their downloads — this is a known pattern for Seafile's distribution infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, it is not the canonical seafile.com domain, and the AppImage is executed directly (installed as a runnable binary with a symlink in /usr/bin). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and unverifiable beyond the hash. The concern is real but mild: if Exoscale storage were compromised or the upstream maintainer's bucket were taken over, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-primary domain, warranting medium severity, though it is likely a legitimate Seafile distribution channel rather than an attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lucas Schwiderski <lucas@lschwiderski.de>
2pkgname=seadrive-cli
3pkgver=3.0.22
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The Seafile Drive client enables you to access files on the server without syncing to local disk. It works like a network drive."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://www.seafile.com/"
8license=('Apache-2.0')
9depends=('zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'fuse2')
10options=('!strip')
11
12_appimage="SeaDrive-cli-${CARCH}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
13source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('3526468353ee6db29964bd8b8ad14d1d7cee68316faebc77158fc2d4c9fd57cf')
15
16prepare() {
17 chmod +x "${_appimage}"
18}
19
20package() {
21 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
22 install -Dm755 "${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
23
24 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
25 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-cli}"
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion