seadrive-cli

MEDIUM
maintainer sclu1034 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io, which is Exoscale's object storage (a Swiss cloud provider). Seafile does legitimately use Exoscale/Exo object storage for their downloads — this is a known pattern for Seafile's distribution infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, it is not the canonical seafile.com domain, and the AppImage is executed directly (installed as a runnable binary with a symlink in /usr/bin). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and unverifiable beyond the hash. The concern is real but mild: if Exoscale storage were compromised or the upstream maintainer's bucket were taken over, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-primary domain, warranting medium severity, though it is likely a legitimate Seafile distribution channel rather than an attack.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io, which is Exoscale's object storage (a Swiss cloud provider). Seafile does legitimately use Exoscale/Exo object storage for their downloads — this is a known pattern for Seafile's distribution infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, it is not the canonical seafile.com domain, and the AppImage is executed directly (installed as a runnable binary with a symlink in /usr/bin). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and unverifiable beyond the hash. The concern is real but mild: if Exoscale storage were compromised or the upstream maintainer's bucket were taken over, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-primary domain, warranting medium severity, though it is likely a legitimate Seafile distribution channel rather than an attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lucas Schwiderski <lucas@lschwiderski.de>
2pkgname=seadrive-cli
3pkgver=3.0.22
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The Seafile Drive client enables you to access files on the server without syncing to local disk. It works like a network drive."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://www.seafile.com/"
8license=('Apache-2.0')
9depends=('zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'fuse2')
10options=('!strip')
11
12_appimage="SeaDrive-cli-${CARCH}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
13source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('3526468353ee6db29964bd8b8ad14d1d7cee68316faebc77158fc2d4c9fd57cf')
15
16prepare() {
17 chmod +x "${_appimage}"
18}
19
20package() {
21 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
22 install -Dm755 "${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
23
24 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
25 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-cli}"
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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