seadrive-cli
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io, which is Exoscale's object storage (a Swiss cloud provider). Seafile does legitimately use Exoscale/Exo object storage for their downloads — this is a known pattern for Seafile's distribution infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, it is not the canonical seafile.com domain, and the AppImage is executed directly (installed as a runnable binary with a symlink in /usr/bin). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but the binary itself is opaque and unverifiable beyond the hash. The concern is real but mild: if Exoscale storage were compromised or the upstream maintainer's bucket were taken over, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern for an executed binary from a non-primary domain, warranting medium severity, though it is likely a legitimate Seafile distribution channel rather than an attack.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Lucas Schwiderski <lucas@lschwiderski.de>
pkgname=seadrive-cli
pkgver=3.0.22
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="The Seafile Drive client enables you to access files on the server without syncing to local disk. It works like a network drive."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.seafile.com/"
license=('Apache-2.0')
depends=('zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'fuse2')
options=('!strip')
_appimage="SeaDrive-cli-${CARCH}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
source_x86_64=("${_appimage}::https://sos-ch-dk-2.exo.io/seafile-downloads/${_appimage}")
sha256sums_x86_64=('3526468353ee6db29964bd8b8ad14d1d7cee68316faebc77158fc2d4c9fd57cf')
prepare() {
chmod +x "${_appimage}"
}
package() {
install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
install -Dm755 "${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-cli}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |