sendanywhere

maintainer nailington · 16 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from update.send-anywhere.com (the vendor's own update server) and extracts a native binary (paprika.node) that is installed and executed at runtime via Electron. The host appears to be the official vendor update endpoint for Send Anywhere, not a personal or random host, which reduces concern somewhat. However, the URL always fetches 'sendanywhere_latest_amd64.deb' (a mutable 'latest' URL), meaning the sha512sum pinned in the PKGBUILD will break whenever upstream updates, and any compromise of the vendor's update server would deliver arbitrary code. The paprika.node native addon is executed with full system privileges. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: a prebuilt native binary from a vendor update server with a mutable URL, though the checksum does provide some protection at the time of packaging. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or active attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://update.send-anywhere.com/linux_downloads/sendanywhere_latest_amd64.deb" "LICENSE")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb from update.send-anywhere.com (the vendor's own update server) and extracts a native binary (paprika.node) that is installed and executed at runtime via Electron. The host appears to be the official vendor update endpoint for Send Anywhere, not a personal or random host, which reduces concern somewhat. However, the URL always fetches 'sendanywhere_latest_amd64.deb' (a mutable 'latest' URL), meaning the sha512sum pinned in the PKGBUILD will break whenever upstream updates, and any compromise of the vendor's update server would deliver arbitrary code. The paprika.node native addon is executed with full system privileges. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: a prebuilt native binary from a vendor update server with a mutable URL, though the checksum does provide some protection at the time of packaging. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or active attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Ye Shu <shuye02@outlook.com>
2# Contributor: Aaron Fischer <mail@aaron-fischer.net>
3# Contributor: Ashwin Vishnu <ashuwish+arch at gmail dot com>
4
5pkgname=sendanywhere
6pkgver=24.3.8
7pkgrel=1
8arch=('x86_64')
9
10pkgdesc="Send Anywhere is a multi-platform file sharing service where users can directly share digital content in real time."
11url="http://send-anywhere.com"
12license=('custom')
13depends=('electron8')
14makedepends=('asar')
15
16source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://update.send-anywhere.com/linux_downloads/sendanywhere_latest_amd64.deb" "LICENSE")
17sha512sums=('1efd97e87385eced4ff7ee6ab6041665237ec2e160307b0bd326f5d65ca9c07f89d0c903addc4b84edae0e3f61bb0597ad70d0440a47981700665280ae964850'
18 'aeb97a12f246d78cbf202354148b429a037997d68087bceed5d5ce5036443d779c2535138b54347579ddf05994a61b9333913f9261733f367d02e0e9cf7d0b5e')
19# If validity check fails, please leave a comment to remind me to update the package version
20
21package(){
22 # Extract the data package
23 tar -xf data.tar.xz
24 cd $srcdir/opt/SendAnywhere
25
26 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/lib/$pkgname
27
28 # HACKS FOR SYSTEM ELECTRON
29 asar e resources/app.asar resources/app
30 sed -i "s|,\"paprika.node\"|,\"/usr/lib/$pkgname/paprika.node\"|" resources/app/src/main/main.prod.js
31
32 # Copy Relevanat data
33 cp -r resources/app $pkgdir/usr/lib/$pkgname/
34 cp paprika.node $pkgdir/usr/lib/$pkgname/
35
36 cd $srcdir
37
38 # Create starter script
39 echo "#!/bin/sh" >> $pkgname
40 echo "exec electron8 /usr/lib/$pkgname/app \$@" >> $pkgname
41 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/bin
42 install -Dm 755 $pkgname $pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname
43
44 # Install .desktop and icon
45 cp -r usr/share $pkgdir/usr/
46 sed -i "s|Exec=.*|Exec=/usr/bin/$pkgname|" $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/SendAnywhere.desktop
47 sed -i "s|StartupWMClass=.*|StartupWMClass=Send Anywhere|" $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/SendAnywhere.desktop
48
49 # Add licenses
50 install -Dm644 $srcdir/LICENSE "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
51}
52

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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