serproid
The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
"https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Paulo Matias <matias@ufscar.br>
pkgname=serproid
pkgver=2.1.6
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='PKCS#11 driver for cloud-based digital certificates issued by Serpro'
arch=('x86_64')
url='https://serproid.serpro.gov.br'
license=('custom')
depends=('java-environment>=25' 'java-openjfx' 'openssl' 'gcc-libs' 'bash')
makedepends=('tar')
source=("serproid"
"https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('6b9104609aa7866587827686f67a040841ab57aeb6cf4c7fcd03ff7771c3ffd0'
'0ffa9ffe5bc343cc758a12f28bd7f08aec4b6e843d1c043baf0b81572461e588')
package() {
tar --zstd --no-same-owner -xf data.tar.zst
rm -rf ./usr/share/serproid-desktop/jre
cp -dr --preserve=mode,timestamp ./usr "$pkgdir/"
install -m755 serproid "$pkgdir/usr/bin/serproid"
ln -s libserproidp11.so "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libneoidp11.so"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |