serproid

maintainer thotypous · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 "https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Paulo Matias <matias@ufscar.br>
2
3pkgname=serproid
4pkgver=2.1.6
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='PKCS#11 driver for cloud-based digital certificates issued by Serpro'
7arch=('x86_64')
8url='https://serproid.serpro.gov.br'
9license=('custom')
10depends=('java-environment>=25' 'java-openjfx' 'openssl' 'gcc-libs' 'bash')
11makedepends=('tar')
12source=("serproid"
13 "https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
14sha256sums=('6b9104609aa7866587827686f67a040841ab57aeb6cf4c7fcd03ff7771c3ffd0'
15 '0ffa9ffe5bc343cc758a12f28bd7f08aec4b6e843d1c043baf0b81572461e588')
16
17package() {
18 tar --zstd --no-same-owner -xf data.tar.zst
19
20 rm -rf ./usr/share/serproid-desktop/jre
21 cp -dr --preserve=mode,timestamp ./usr "$pkgdir/"
22
23 install -m755 serproid "$pkgdir/usr/bin/serproid"
24 ln -s libserproidp11.so "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libneoidp11.so"
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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