serproid
The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
"https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary (containing a PKCS#11 shared library and application) from storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br, which is a subdomain of serpro.gov.br — Brazil's federal IT services agency (Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados). This is the official vendor host for Serpro's software distribution infrastructure, not a random personal or unofficial host. The sha256sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the concern is not zero: the binary is a prebuilt executable/library (libserproidp11.so) that gets installed into /usr/lib and loaded by browsers/applications as a PKCS#11 module — a highly privileged position. There is no source build, so users must trust the upstream binary entirely. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host) rather than a clear attack, and the host is plausibly official. The cheaper model's concern about 'non-standard host' is partially a false positive since serpro.gov.br is a Brazilian government domain, but the prebuilt binary nature of the package is a genuine supply-chain consideration worth flagging as medium.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Paulo Matias <matias@ufscar.br>
pkgname=serproid
pkgver=2.1.6
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='PKCS#11 driver for cloud-based digital certificates issued by Serpro'
arch=('x86_64')
url='https://serproid.serpro.gov.br'
license=('custom')
depends=('java-environment>=25' 'java-openjfx' 'openssl' 'gcc-libs' 'bash')
makedepends=('tar')
source=("serproid"
"https://storagegw.estaleiro.serpro.gov.br/instalador-desktop/SerproID-$pkgver-amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('6b9104609aa7866587827686f67a040841ab57aeb6cf4c7fcd03ff7771c3ffd0'
'0ffa9ffe5bc343cc758a12f28bd7f08aec4b6e843d1c043baf0b81572461e588')
package() {
tar --zstd --no-same-owner -xf data.tar.zst
rm -rf ./usr/share/serproid-desktop/jre
cp -dr --preserve=mode,timestamp ./usr "$pkgdir/"
install -m755 serproid "$pkgdir/usr/bin/serproid"
ln -s libserproidp11.so "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libneoidp11.so"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |