shalou

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

• PKGBUILD:49 source=("https://app-1320188180.cos.ap-nanjing.myqcloud.com/pc/install/${pkgver}/shalou${pkgver}.deb")

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from a Tencent Cloud Object Storage (COS) bucket (myqcloud.com is the official Tencent Cloud COS domain, not a random personal host), belonging to app-1320188180, which appears to be the vendor's own cloud storage for distribution. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. However, this is still a prebuilt closed-source binary from a non-official-repository host (not the project's own domain shalou.net, and not a well-known mirror), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. The package installs into /opt, /usr/bin, /usr/lib etc. If the COS bucket were compromised or the maintainer changed the URL without updating the checksum, a malicious binary could be delivered. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an unofficial/cloud-storage host with a pinned hash but no additional verification (e.g., GPG signature). The cheaper model's assessment is correct in classification.