shayla

MEDIUM

maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Louis Solofrizzo <louis@ne02ptzero.me>
    
      2pkgname=shayla
    
      3pkgver=1.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="A fast and simple static site generator"
    
      6arch=("x86_64")
    
      7url="https://git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla"
    
      8license=("GPL3")
    
      9provides=("shayla")
    
      10conflicts=("shayla-git")
    
      11source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")
    
      12sha256sums=('ce12570f4dc9c5d8650475e8ac8b73ac64dc6b2f74932bd0d878de2ef3c3472d')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15    mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
    
      16    cp ${pkgname} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      17    chmod +x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2