shayla

MEDIUM

maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Louis Solofrizzo <louis@ne02ptzero.me>
    
      2pkgname=shayla
    
      3pkgver=1.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="A fast and simple static site generator"
    
      6arch=("x86_64")
    
      7url="https://git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla"
    
      8license=("GPL3")
    
      9provides=("shayla")
    
      10conflicts=("shayla-git")
    
      11source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")
    
      12sha256sums=('ce12570f4dc9c5d8650475e8ac8b73ac64dc6b2f74932bd0d878de2ef3c3472d')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15    mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
    
      16    cp ${pkgname} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      17    chmod +x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2