shayla

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary directly from a personal S3 bucket (Scaleway object storage under the maintainer's account 'ne02ptzero-binaries') and installs it as an executable in /usr/bin. There is no source code compilation, no official release artifact from the canonical upstream (git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla), and no reproducibility guarantee. The sha256sum provides integrity against accidental corruption but not against intentional replacement by whoever controls the S3 bucket. This is a classic supply-chain concern: a compromised or hijacked personal S3 bucket could silently serve a malicious binary to all users. The upstream project exists and the maintainer appears to be the same person, so this is not clearly malicious, but distributing a closed prebuilt binary from a personal object store rather than building from source is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Louis Solofrizzo <louis@ne02ptzero.me>
    
      2pkgname=shayla
    
      3pkgver=1.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="A fast and simple static site generator"
    
      6arch=("x86_64")
    
      7url="https://git.sr.ht/~ne02ptzero/shayla"
    
      8license=("GPL3")
    
      9provides=("shayla")
    
      10conflicts=("shayla-git")
    
      11source=("https://s3.fr-par.scw.cloud/ne02ptzero-binaries/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/x86_64/shayla")
    
      12sha256sums=('ce12570f4dc9c5d8650475e8ac8b73ac64dc6b2f74932bd0d878de2ef3c3472d')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15    mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
    
      16    cp ${pkgname} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      17    chmod +x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}
    
      18}
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2