shutter-encoder
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the official project domain (shutterencoder.com), extracts it, and installs the binaries directly without building from source. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern: the package installs pre-compiled binaries (including a bundled JVM application with native libs) from a single upstream host with no reproducibility guarantee. However, the host is the official project website, there is a sha256sum pinning the specific release, and the project is a well-known video converter tool. The sha256sum provides integrity verification against the specific file at time of packaging, though it cannot protect against a future silent replacement at the same URL. This pattern (binary repackaging from official vendor site with checksum) is common in AUR and represents a medium supply-chain risk rather than a high or clean rating — the binary is executed, it comes from a non-forge personal/project domain, and there is no source build. Not piracy, not broken.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:10
source=("https://www.shutterencoder.com/Shutter%20Encoder%20$pkgver%20Linux%2064bits.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the official project domain (shutterencoder.com), extracts it, and installs the binaries directly without building from source. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern: the package installs pre-compiled binaries (including a bundled JVM application with native libs) from a single upstream host with no reproducibility guarantee. However, the host is the official project website, there is a sha256sum pinning the specific release, and the project is a well-known video converter tool. The sha256sum provides integrity verification against the specific file at time of packaging, though it cannot protect against a future silent replacement at the same URL. This pattern (binary repackaging from official vendor site with checksum) is common in AUR and represents a medium supply-chain risk rather than a high or clean rating — the binary is executed, it comes from a non-forge personal/project domain, and there is no source build. Not piracy, not broken.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Romain Bazile <gromain.baz@gmail.com>
pkgname=shutter-encoder
pkgver=20.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Converter for all formats video|audio|image professionnals codecs and standards - swiss knife tool for Linux"
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://www.shutterencoder.com/"
license=('GPL')
depends=(java-runtime ffmpeg vlc mediainfo dvdauthor mkvtoolnix-cli perl-image-exiftool dcraw p7zip libcanberra uriparser util-linux-libs expat yt-dlp)
source=("https://www.shutterencoder.com/Shutter%20Encoder%20$pkgver%20Linux%2064bits.deb")
options=('!strip')
sha256sums=('4c1fdec901ca7abff63811972ab5720ec67ff4627dc7077bf58b15728232dc2e')
prepare() {
mkdir -p shutter-encoder
tar -xf data.tar.zst -C shutter-encoder/
}
package() {
# Move main folder in place
mv "${srcdir}"/shutter-encoder/usr "${pkgdir}"/;
mkdir -p "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/
install -m 644 "${pkgdir}"/usr/lib/Shutter\ Encoder/usr/bin/icon.png "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/shutter-encoder.png
chmod -R 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/Shutter\ Encoder/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |