shutu_client-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer KafCoppelia 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from static.shutu.cn, which is a CDN/static subdomain of the official shutu.cn domain (the project's own URL listed in the 'url' field). This is a standard pattern for vendors hosting release artifacts on a static subdomain. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob with no source build, and the license is 'unknown'. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. The main concern is that this is an opaque, closed-source binary being installed with setuid (chmod 4755 on chrome-sandbox, which is normal for Electron apps) from a Chinese vendor's CDN. The host is not unofficial or personal — it is the vendor's own static asset server — so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a supply-chain risk. The medium rating is marginally justified only because it is a closed-source prebuilt binary with unknown license, not because the host is suspicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source_x86_64=("https://static.shutu.cn/client/download/ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from static.shutu.cn, which is a CDN/static subdomain of the official shutu.cn domain (the project's own URL listed in the 'url' field). This is a standard pattern for vendors hosting release artifacts on a static subdomain. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob with no source build, and the license is 'unknown'. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. The main concern is that this is an opaque, closed-source binary being installed with setuid (chmod 4755 on chrome-sandbox, which is normal for Electron apps) from a Chinese vendor's CDN. The host is not unofficial or personal — it is the vendor's own static asset server — so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a supply-chain risk. The medium rating is marginally justified only because it is a closed-source prebuilt binary with unknown license, not because the host is suspicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: KafCoppelia <k740677208@gmail.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=shutu_client-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.0.7
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A new generation of 'AI intelligence' mind map"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://shutu.cn/"
    
      9license=('unknown')
    
      10conflicts=('shutu_client')
    
      11depends=('nss' 'gtk3' 'alsa-lib')
    
      12provides=('shutu_client')
    
      13
    
      14source_x86_64=("https://static.shutu.cn/client/download/ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb")
    
      15sha256sums_x86_64=('923bd86ab825a23aa31e0b8aaf04f56a3fd427c23f8f78a6fe31b9cf1eae30f3')
    
      16
    
      17prepare() {
    
      18    cd "${srcdir}"
    
      19    /usr/bin/ar p "ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar xf -
    
      20}
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23    cd "${pkgdir}"
    
      24    cp -R "${srcdir}/opt" "opt"
    
      25    cp -R "${srcdir}/usr" "usr"
    
      26
    
      27    # Rename the Chinese directory
    
      28    mv -f "opt/树图思维导图" "opt/shutu_client"
    
      29
    
      30    chmod 4755 "opt/shutu_client/chrome-sandbox"
    
      31    # Modify the "Exec" but don't change the "Name"
    
      32    sed -i 's/树图思维导图\//shutu_client\//g' "usr/share/applications/shutu_client.desktop"
    
      33
    
      34    mkdir -p "usr/bin"
    
      35    
    
      36    ln -sf "/opt/shutu_client/shutu_client" "usr/bin/shutu"
    
      37    ln -sf "/opt/shutu_client/shutu_client" "usr/bin/shutu_client"
    
      38}
    
      39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2