shutu_client-bin

maintainer KafCoppelia · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from static.shutu.cn, which is a CDN/static subdomain of the official shutu.cn domain (the project's own URL listed in the 'url' field). This is a standard pattern for vendors hosting release artifacts on a static subdomain. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob with no source build, and the license is 'unknown'. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. The main concern is that this is an opaque, closed-source binary being installed with setuid (chmod 4755 on chrome-sandbox, which is normal for Electron apps) from a Chinese vendor's CDN. The host is not unofficial or personal — it is the vendor's own static asset server — so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a supply-chain risk. The medium rating is marginally justified only because it is a closed-source prebuilt binary with unknown license, not because the host is suspicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source_x86_64=("https://static.shutu.cn/client/download/ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from static.shutu.cn, which is a CDN/static subdomain of the official shutu.cn domain (the project's own URL listed in the 'url' field). This is a standard pattern for vendors hosting release artifacts on a static subdomain. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob with no source build, and the license is 'unknown'. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. The main concern is that this is an opaque, closed-source binary being installed with setuid (chmod 4755 on chrome-sandbox, which is normal for Electron apps) from a Chinese vendor's CDN. The host is not unofficial or personal — it is the vendor's own static asset server — so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a supply-chain risk. The medium rating is marginally justified only because it is a closed-source prebuilt binary with unknown license, not because the host is suspicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: KafCoppelia <k740677208@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=shutu_client-bin
4pkgver=1.0.7
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A new generation of 'AI intelligence' mind map"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://shutu.cn/"
9license=('unknown')
10conflicts=('shutu_client')
11depends=('nss' 'gtk3' 'alsa-lib')
12provides=('shutu_client')
13
14source_x86_64=("https://static.shutu.cn/client/download/ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb")
15sha256sums_x86_64=('923bd86ab825a23aa31e0b8aaf04f56a3fd427c23f8f78a6fe31b9cf1eae30f3')
16
17prepare() {
18 cd "${srcdir}"
19 /usr/bin/ar p "ShuTu-Linux-${pkgver}.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar xf -
20}
21
22package() {
23 cd "${pkgdir}"
24 cp -R "${srcdir}/opt" "opt"
25 cp -R "${srcdir}/usr" "usr"
26
27 # Rename the Chinese directory
28 mv -f "opt/树图思维导图" "opt/shutu_client"
29
30 chmod 4755 "opt/shutu_client/chrome-sandbox"
31 # Modify the "Exec" but don't change the "Name"
32 sed -i 's/树图思维导图\//shutu_client\//g' "usr/share/applications/shutu_client.desktop"
33
34 mkdir -p "usr/bin"
35
36 ln -sf "/opt/shutu_client/shutu_client" "usr/bin/shutu"
37 ln -sf "/opt/shutu_client/shutu_client" "usr/bin/shutu_client"
38}
39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion