sigueme
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from the project's own website (proyectosigueme.com), which is the official upstream URL matching the package's url= field. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source is a prebuilt binary blob (a .deb file) rather than source code, meaning whatever is inside is executed/installed without compilation or inspection; (2) the integrity check is only MD5, which is cryptographically weak; (3) the license is listed as 'unknown'; (4) the build() function attempts to extract data.tar.gz without first extracting it from the .deb archive — the .deb is not unpacked into data.tar.gz automatically, so this PKGBUILD is likely broken as written; (5) the upstream host is a small project website that could disappear or be compromised. The host is the official project site, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk for a prebuilt binary. The broken extraction logic is also notable. Overall this is a medium-risk prebuilt binary from a small unofficial host with weak integrity verification.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=(http://www.proyectosigueme.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sigueme.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from the project's own website (proyectosigueme.com), which is the official upstream URL matching the package's url= field. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source is a prebuilt binary blob (a .deb file) rather than source code, meaning whatever is inside is executed/installed without compilation or inspection; (2) the integrity check is only MD5, which is cryptographically weak; (3) the license is listed as 'unknown'; (4) the build() function attempts to extract data.tar.gz without first extracting it from the .deb archive — the .deb is not unpacked into data.tar.gz automatically, so this PKGBUILD is likely broken as written; (5) the upstream host is a small project website that could disappear or be compromised. The host is the official project site, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk for a prebuilt binary. The broken extraction logic is also notable. Overall this is a medium-risk prebuilt binary from a small unofficial host with weak integrity verification.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: doragasu <doragasu (yawn) hotmail (roll) com>
pkgname=sigueme
pkgver=1.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Application for enhancing visual focus on people with autism spectrum disorder (warning: only in spanish language)."
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://www.proyectosigueme.com/"
license=('unknown')
groups=()
depends=('java-runtime-headless' 'vlc')
provides=('sigueme')
conflicts=('sigueme')
source=(http://www.proyectosigueme.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sigueme.deb)
md5sums=('be82c63a48ecc0366c2b0a7bf653f59a')
build() {
tar -xzf data.tar.gz
}
package() {
cp -r "$srcdir/usr" "$pkgdir"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |