sitala-bin
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source_x86_64=("https://decomposer.de/sitala/releases/sitala-1.0_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (containing a drum sampler VST plugin and standalone app) directly from decomposer.de, which is the official upstream vendor domain matching the url= field. This is not a personal/random host — it is the developer's own distribution site. However, the package still presents a real supply-chain concern: it installs a prebuilt closed-source binary with no source code, the license is listed as 'unknown', and the sha512sum provided has only 127 hex characters (should be 128 for SHA-512), suggesting a possible truncation error in the checksum. The extraction step also skips the .deb structure verification (no ar extraction, jumps straight to tar xzf data.tar.gz without verifying the .deb was properly unpacked first), which is sloppy. The binary itself is executed code from a closed-source vendor distributed as a prebuilt blob. The domain matches the official upstream, reducing but not eliminating supply-chain risk. Overall this is a legitimate medium: prebuilt closed-source binary installed directly, with a potentially malformed checksum.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: urklang <nicolas at zrna dot org>
# Contributor: urklang <nicolas at zrna dot org>
pkgname=sitala-bin
pkgver=1.0.9
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Drum sampler plugin and standalone app."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://decomposer.de/sitala/"
license=('unknown')
depends=('alsa-lib>=1.0.16' 'freetype2>=2.2.1' 'glibc>=2.27' 'libcurl-gnutls>=7.16.2' 'libx11' 'libxext')
options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
source_x86_64=("https://decomposer.de/sitala/releases/sitala-1.0_amd64.deb")
sha512sums_x86_64=('294f313969c9ef9a2a2fca80b34d4ff537d60012ccf0112db365a4706d3e98a2a46a5c75fd37fbdeb7365c1ceca06dea77b3274317e8db0a5ece473f399b70c4')
package(){
# Extract package data
tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |