slurp-vst-bin

maintainer isivisi · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (SLURP VST plugin) from a personal domain (isivisi.ca) rather than a well-known code hosting platform like GitHub releases. The binary is executed/installed directly. While a sha256 checksum is provided (mitigating tampering in transit), the checksum only protects against the specific downloaded file being altered after the PKGBUILD was written — it does not protect against the domain owner replacing the file at the same URL with a new malicious version (the checksum would then fail, but the risk window exists). Additionally, the package() function installs files directly into the user's home directory (~/.vst3/ and ~/.clap/) rather than $pkgdir, which is non-standard and bypasses package management tracking. The source is the maintainer's own personal website, which is the official distribution point for this plugin, so this is not clearly malicious — but a prebuilt binary from a personal host with home-directory installation warrants medium concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 "https://isivisi.ca/slurp/downloads/SLURP-linux-x64.zip"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (SLURP VST plugin) from a personal domain (isivisi.ca) rather than a well-known code hosting platform like GitHub releases. The binary is executed/installed directly. While a sha256 checksum is provided (mitigating tampering in transit), the checksum only protects against the specific downloaded file being altered after the PKGBUILD was written — it does not protect against the domain owner replacing the file at the same URL with a new malicious version (the checksum would then fail, but the risk window exists). Additionally, the package() function installs files directly into the user's home directory (~/.vst3/ and ~/.clap/) rather than $pkgdir, which is non-standard and bypasses package management tracking. The source is the maintainer's own personal website, which is the official distribution point for this plugin, so this is not clearly malicious — but a prebuilt binary from a personal host with home-directory installation warrants medium concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: John Iannandrea <github.com/isivisi>
2
3pkgname='slurp-vst-bin'
4pkgver=1.1.5
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="The freely distributed version of the SLURP VST Plugin."
7url='https://isivisi.ca/slurp'
8license=('SLURP-EULA')
9arch=(x86_64)
10groups=()
11depends=()
12makedepends=()
13
14source=(
15 "https://isivisi.ca/slurp/downloads/SLURP-linux-x64.zip"
16)
17
18sha256sums=(
19 732d2e124eaa06c9833654a98995b91e0a3769df0badd4be8abbcdafdef2bf61
20)
21
22package() {
23 install -vDm 755 ./bin/SLURP "$pkgdir/usr/bin/SLURP"
24 install -vDm 644 ../SLURP.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/SLURP.desktop"
25 cp -r ./bin/SLURP.vst3 ~/.vst3/SLURP.vst3
26 cp ./bin/SLURP.clap ~/.clap/SLURP.clap
27}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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